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International banking is essentially a facet of international economic interdepen-
dence. Over the second half of the twentieth century as during the decades before
1931, the growth of cross-currency and cross-border banking, together with banks’
transnational expansion through branches and subsidiaries, were ‘pull’ and ‘push’
factors within rising economic and ﬁnancial globalisation. Nationalistic interwar
retrenchment from 1931 and the resultant ‘U’-shaped pattern of internationalisation
over the twentieth century has suggested to some a ‘back-to-the-future’ scenario,
in which the new millennium’s international economy hardly compares with the
level of ﬁnancial integration attained during pre-1914 globalisation.1 However, this
interpretation’s general validity has been convincingly disputed by recent studies.
These emphasise the many aspects of post-1970 globalisation – in both scope and
scale – that make it substantially diﬀerent from its historical antecedent.2 The
resulting scholarly debate has raised interesting questions. Should international
banking’s revival from the 1960s be viewed as a return to patterns that emerged
with the pre-1914 global wave? Or should banking’s recent internationalisation
be regarded as a secular shift in scale and scope towards something qualitatively
unprecedented? This article aims to provide some tentative answers.
As is known, international banking raises two discrete though interrelated sets of
issues. One, concerned with international ﬁnance, mainly focuses upon banks as
agents and vehicles for international capital ﬂows. The other, rooted in industrial
1 See R. Zevin, ‘Are world ﬁnancial markets more open? If so, why and with what eﬀects?’, in T.
Bassuri and J. B. Schor (eds), Financial Openness and National Autonomy (Oxford, 1992); and J. Sachs
and A. Warner, ‘Economic reform and the process of global integration’, Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 1 (1995).
2 See M. D. Bordo, B. Eichengreen and J. Kim, ‘Was there really an earlier period of international
ﬁnancial integration comparable to today?’, NBER Working Paper, 6738 (1998), pp. 7–8. They
emphasise the larger scale of post-1970 ﬂows as well as qualitative diﬀerences in the sectoral and
functional composition of portfolios and the predominance of foreign direct investments over
portfolio investments. See also M. D. Bordo, B. Eichengreen and D. A. Irwin, ‘Is globalisation today
really diﬀerent than globalisation a hundred years ago?’, NBER Working Paper, 7195 (1999),
pp. 27–56.
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organisation, has led to the emergence of a theory of multinational banking
addressing competitive advantages, organisation and management.3 This article
attempts to reconcile these two perspectives in a more comprehensive approach,
based upon recent theories of ﬁnancial intermediation and innovation. Section I
outlines both the conceptual framework employed to analyse the functions per-
formed by banks in their international activities and the role of ﬁnancial innovations
in enabling them to discharge such functions more eﬃciently. Sections II and III
draw a stylised, comparative account of relevant ﬁnancial innovations within inter-
national banking during the 1890–1931 and 1958–81 periods, considered here
respectively as the ‘Golden Eras’ of traditional international banking and ‘revol-
utionary’ Eurobanking. Section IV provides a long-term historical perspective and
raises some further questions.
I
Current theories of banking consider that ﬁnancial intermediaries perform two
diﬀerent functions: brokerage and portfolio transformation.4 Brokerage implies
obtaining, processing and supplying information to bring borrowers and lenders
together but without altering the nature of claims transacted. As brokers, banks
enjoy cost advantages for overcoming both ex ante and ex post information asymmet-
ries, while reducing market imperfections by lowering search, information and
transaction costs. They earn fees by providing evaluation, advising and monitoring
services.5 When banks also provide services that qualitatively alter the nature of
claims transacted, they discharge a function of portfolio transformation. In these
cases, banks stipulate contracts for acquiring primary securities issued by borrowers
(thus actually internalising information within their assets portfolio).6 They also
enter a diﬀerent contractual relationship by oﬀering to lenders secondary securities
drawn upon themselves – thus acting as ‘delegated monitors’.7 With ‘debt
3 See R. Z. Aliber, ‘International banking. A survey’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 16 (1984),
pp. 661–4.
4 Surveys of recent theories of ﬁnancial intermediaries in K. T. Davis and M. K. Lewis, Domestic and
International Banking (Oxford, 1987), pp. 14–32; S. Batthacharya and A. V. Thakor, ‘Contemporary
banking theory’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 3 (1993); and M. K. Lewis, ‘An overview’, in idem
(ed.), Financial Intermediaries (Aldershot, 1995), pp. xiii–xxxii.
5 As dealers, they act as principals by buying and selling assets temporarily held in their books and bear
a contingent liability risk; the spread between buying and selling price is the proﬁt they earn as a
compensation for the risk assumed. Both brokers and dealers make markets possible by altering the
relative use of diﬀerent types of securities, and the overall magnitude of capital transacted.
6 In the case of relationship banking, the contract assumes the character of long-term commitment.
The issue has been addressed by C. Mayer, ‘New issues in corporate ﬁnance’, European Economic
Review, 32 (1988).
7 For the concept of delegated monitoring, see D. W. Diamond, ‘Financial intermediation and
delegated monitoring’, Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1984). A critical assessment is in Batthacharya
and Thakor, ‘Contemporary banking’, pp. 7-15; and M. Hellwig, ‘Banking, ﬁnancial intermediation
and corporate ﬁnance’, in A. Giovannini and C. Mayer (eds), European Financial Integration
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substitution’, primary and secondary securities substantially diﬀer in the degrees of
their liquidity, determined, in turn, by diﬀerences in maturity, marketability,
reversibility, divisibility and capital certainty.8 Portfolio transformation varies with
both the precise process undertaken and the guarantees oﬀered against risk. ‘Size
intermediation’ involves banks acquiring large assets and oﬀering lenders liabilities
representing a share of them without altering their liquidity properties, so producing
‘liquidity distribution’. When banks engage in ‘quality intermediation’ and contracts
with lenders diﬀer qualitatively from those issued to borrowers, they provide
‘liquidity services’ and act as agents of ‘liquidity creation’. By engaging in ‘maturity
transformation’, banks give ‘liquidity insurance’ to both depositors and borrowers.9
Through bearing higher interest, credit and default risks, their managements may
have a stronger incentive to screen, monitor and control borrowers to reduce the
risks of adverse selection and moral hazard.10 Finally, banks supply oﬀ-balance sheets
services – guarantees and commitments of an intermediate nature – that tend to blur
boundaries between brokerage and portfolio transformation.11
Banks can be viewed, therefore, as peculiar ﬁnancial intermediaries that provide
speciﬁc packages of information and liquidity insurance services to customers, and
bridge the diﬀerent portfolio preferences of borrowers and lenders. They also
manage the payment system and provide mechanisms for saving and borrowing. As
asset transformers, they monitor and discipline borrowers and bear risks that require
8 Marketability relates to the ease and speed with which the value of an asset can be realised.
Reversibility refers to the discrepancy between the contemporaneous acquisition and realisation of
an asset (depending upon transaction costs). Divisibility is reﬂected in the minimum denomination
in which transactions in a given asset can take place. Capital certainty is the degree of predictability
of an asset’s future value. As a combination of such characteristics, ‘liquidity’ can be hardly measured
and ‘lies very much in the eye of the beholder, since it reﬂects in part assessments of future conditions
in the market’: see Davis and Lewis, Domestic and International, pp. 28–9.
9 Depositors are given guarantee that their deposits can be withdrawn on demand or at short notice,
in full or in part, at a ﬁxed price. Borrowers are given guarantee of availability of funds to borrowers.
The nature of such insurance depends upon the nature of the loan contract – whether it is ﬁxed or
ﬂoating rate. In both cases, risk and cost of servicing are recovered from the spread and service
charges.
10 See Batthacharya and Thakor, ‘Contemporary banking’, pp. 29–31. Liquidity risk is the risk of
sudden withdrawal of funds by lenders. Credit and default risk refer to possible losses that stem from
a decline in the market value of assets held in portfolio. Adverse selection and moral hazard both
refer to information asymmetries that give borrowers an advantage over lenders as to the potential
of their investment projects and their commitment to investment decisions taken.
11 See Davis and Lewis, Domestic and International, pp. 115–22. By providing guarantees that create oﬀ-
balance sheet exposure (such as bill acceptances), banks, against the payment of a fee, substitute
their own credit rating for that of the debtor and reduce the credit and default risk assumed by the
creditor. In underwriting contracts for securities issues, the fee earned by banks can be seen as
‘insurance premium’ charged to borrowers against the risk of the market not absorbing a ﬂotation
at the hoped for price. In loan commitments, banks reduce the liquidity risk of borrowers and
are rewarded with a commitment fee. See also A. V. Thakor, ‘Toward a theory of bank loan
commitments’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 6 (1982).144 financial history review
appropriate pricing and eﬃcient processing techniques to allow them to increase
their income.
Diﬀerences in relative functional specialisation and the range of services oﬀered
determine how banking institutions are categorised. Over time, banks (like other
ﬁnancial intermediaries) react, variously, to external shocks, changing environmen-
tal conditions and internal constraints by devising innovative ways for performing
their functions and managing risks. Financial innovation, therefore, is a historical
process that can be systematically analysed and interpreted by determining the
factors and conditions that initiated the supply of, and demand for, new ﬁnancial
products, techniques or institutions. However, ﬁnancial innovation is, notoriously,
an elusive and controversial concept and no generally accepted theory has yet
emerged.12
Clear-cut distinctions between product and process innovation are diﬃcult to
establish. Sometimes, innovations solely transfer and adapt techniques across sectors,
or comprise the rise of an existing practice to an unprecedented scale. Demand-side
approaches emphasise technological progress and increases in real income as the
primary stimuli producing a secularly rising requirement for diversiﬁed ﬁnancial
claims with new combinations of characteristics.13 Conversely, supply-side
approaches focus upon exogenous factors, such as the impact of information and
data-processing technology (which enable new types of operation, or stimulate the
introduction of new techniques by lowering their costs). Or, they may consider
endogenous responses to regulation (which induce circumventing innovation and
trigger a ‘regulatory dialectic’ process),14 external monetary shocks15 or opportunit-
ies to reduce transaction costs provided by information technology.16 Indeed, the
‘circumventive’ theory has been incorporated within an eclectic consensus view
that itself considers ﬁnancial innovations as a reaction to exogenous changes in
constraints – a general concept encompassing government-imposed, self-imposed
(cartels) and market-imposed constraints.17
12 Surveys of theories of ﬁnancial innovations in S. I. Greenbaum and B. Higgins, ‘Financial inno-
vation’, in G. J. Benston (ed.), Financial Services: The Changing Institutions and Government Policy
(Englewood Cliﬀs, NJ, 1983), pp. 230–3; and T. M. Podolski, Financial Innovation and the Money
Supply (Oxford, 1986), pp. 106–12, 181–215.
13 See S. I. Greenbaum and C. F. Heywood, ‘Secular change in the ﬁnancial services industry’, Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 3 (1971). State regulation imposed for the sake of ‘stability’ is assumed
to alter substantially the ‘natural’ evolution of ﬁnancial structures.
14 The circumventive innovation approach has been formalised by E. J. Kane, ‘Good intentions and
unintended evil’, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 9 (1977). See also D. D. Hester, ‘Innovation
and monetary control’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1 (1981).
15 See R. Sylla, ‘Monetary innovation and crises in American economic history’, in P. Wachtel (ed.),
Crises in the Economic and Financial Structure (New York, 1982); and A. M. Wojnilower, ‘The central
role of credit crunches in recent ﬁnancial history’, Brookings Papers in Economic Activity, 2 (1980).
16 J. Niehans, ‘Innovation in monetary policy’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 6 (1982); and Podolski,
Financial Innovation, pp. 203–8.
17 See W. L. Silber, ‘Towards a theory of ﬁnancial innovations’, in idem (ed.), Financial Innovation
(Lexington, MA, 1975), pp. 61–71; and idem, ‘The process of ﬁnancial innovation’, American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 73 (1983).145 golden ages of international banking
Since the demand for ﬁnancial instruments arises from their embodied character-
istics, attention has increasingly focused upon speciﬁc incentives to innovate. These
take the form of demand for liquidity, credit, equity and risk-transferring mechan-
isms emerging from changes within the economic environment (including monet-
ary policy, regulation and competition), as well as from ﬁnancial intermediaries’
own portfolio preferences and constraints. Innovations emerge because they
enhance the eﬃciency of the functions performed by ﬁnancial intermediaries under
changing circumstances - through the design of new instruments, techniques, insti-
tutional arrangements and markets, or by unbundling and repackaging characteristics
of existing products and practices. Consistent with this view, ﬁnancial innovations
can be categorised, variously, as: liquidity-enhancing, credit-generating, equity-
generating, and risk-transferring. Or, and complementarily, as: aggressive (stemming
from competition, research investment and active marketing by specialised insti-
tutions), defensive (reacting to policy and regulatory changes), responsive (adapting
to changes in portfolio requirements of customers), and protective (adopted by
ﬁnancial intermediaries to meet their own portfolio constraints).18
This article proposes an interpretation of the history of innovation in modern
international banking based upon the conceptual framework brieﬂy outlined.
Functions performed by banks in their international activities diﬀer from domestic
only in their cross-border and/or cross-currency nature. The additional risks borne
are country and currency risks, which require speciﬁc techniques to be priced,
allocated, diversiﬁed and compensated for. As brokers (usually associated with
investment banking), banks oﬀer evaluation, monitoring and advisory services to
foreign customers. They also supply liquid and standardised instruments for manag-
ing international payments, and operate monetary exchange between diﬀerent cur-
rencies. They manage liability and asset international portfolios (including deposits
and loans), operate both international liquidity distribution and creation, and act
both as principals for, and agents of, international capital ﬂows. The ﬁnancial
innovations adopted are analysed here as a process of incentives and responses to
changes in the economic and regulatory environment (either domestic or inter-
national), through which bank managements have designed new products,
techniques or institutional arrangements to perform international functions.19
II
Throughout the decades between the 1890 Baring crisis and the systemic collapse
of 1931, the upsurge of international banking was a manifestation of a truly world-
wide interdependent economy. It was also a response to structural changes in
18 See D. Llewellyn, ‘Financial innovation: a basic analysis’, in H. Cavanna (ed.), Financial Innovation
(London, 1992), pp. 19–24.
19 See G. Dufey and I. H. Giddy, ‘The evolution of instruments and techniques in international
ﬁnancial markets’, SUERF Series (1981), 35A, pp. 1–6.146 financial history review
communications technology, the sustained expansion of trade and the increased
capital requirements of governments, public utilities and industrial companies.20
The institutional architecture of the international monetary system was particu-
larly conducive to the internationalisation of ﬁnance. Under the classic gold stan-
dard, access to ﬁnancial markets was generally free and capital controls limited.
Central-bank intervention was based upon market-oriented instruments,21
exchange rates remained fairly stable and conﬁdence in the public commitment to
gold parities and external convertibility high.22 With the gradual evolution of a de
facto gold-exchange standard, substantial ‘lines of defence’ were erected in the form
of liquid foreign-exchange reserves (foreign bills and bonds, balances with foreign
central and commercial banks) to provide means for sterilising gold movements and
making monetary adjustment more ﬂexible.23 The allocation of international liquid-
ity24 was largely determined by microeconomic factors within a decentralised
framework since capital ﬂows comprised mainly private investment and payments.
This remained the case even during the 1920s, when private ﬁnancial houses acted
especially as agents of governments and diplomacy.25 Despite unprecedented insta-
bility and volatility of interest rates and the foreign exchanges, the monetary auth-
orities’ attitude towards regulation and controls over international ﬁnancial
transactions remained fairly liberal.26
20 R. Cameron, ‘Introduction’, in R. Cameron and V. I. Bovykin (eds), International Banking
1870–1914 (Oxford, 1991), pp. 12–14.
21 ‘Gold devices’, discount-rate actions and open-market operations were employed to manipulate
capital ﬂows and sterilise gold movements: see A. Bloomﬁeld, Monetary Policy Under the Gold
Standard 1880–1914 (New York, 1959); and L. Gomes, The International Adjustment Mechanism. From
the Gold Standard to the EMS (London, 1993), pp. 151–69.
22 B. Eichengreen, Globalising Capital. A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton, 1996),
pp. 25–38. On the interrelationships between capital control, adjustment and conﬁdence issues, see
G. M. Gallarotti, The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime. The Classical Gold Standard,
1880–1914 (Oxford, 1995), pp. 45–57 and 207–17.
23 See A. Bloomﬁeld, Short-Term Capital Movements Under the Pre-1914 Gold Standard, Princeton
Studies in International Finance, 11 (Princeton, 1963); M. De Cecco, The International Gold
Standard. Money and Empire (London, 1984), pp. 39–61; and M. Bordo, ‘The gold standard: the
traditional approach’, in M. D. Bordo and A. J. Schwartz (eds), A Retrospective on the Classical Gold
Standard, 1821–1931 (Chicago, 1984), pp. 23–98.
24 The concept of international liquidity has been used with many diﬀerent meanings. See H. Genberg
and A. K. Swoboda, ‘The provision of liquidity in the Bretton Woods system’, in M. Bordo and B.
Eichengreen (eds), A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System. Lessons for International Monetary
Reform (Chicago, 1993), pp. 271–5. For present purposes, the issue of international liquidity refers
to the nature of international money (the reserve question) and the ability of countries to access this
money – i.e. how countries are able to attract capital to ﬁnance temporary balance-of-payments
deﬁcits (the ‘monetary’ adjustment question), and how capitals move within an international
monetary regime (the capital ﬂows question): see Gallarotti, The Anatomy, pp. 7–14.
25 M. De Cecco, ‘The international debt problem in the interwar period’, EUI Working Paper (1984),
n. 103. See also the classic study by H. Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar, 1919–1932 (New York,
1966).
26 American and British authorities retained some politically-oriented controls on access of foreign
borrowers to their capital markets. Oﬃcial government authorisation was required in the USA,147 golden ages of international banking
The expansion of banks’ transnational activities from ‘core’ industrialised coun-
tries was perhaps the most visible sign of ﬁnancial globalisation. Foreign banks’
entry was generally unhindered in most countries, though subject to political and
economic conditions. It occurred through agencies, branches, subsidiaries or joint
ventures (the acquisition of local banks or participations). Within a multitude of
motivations, strategies, organisation and operating criteria varying between banks
and countries, two major patterns of transnationalisation emerged: one responding
to the incentives of economic and ﬁnancial penetration into host countries; the
other to obtaining direct access to international or supranational ﬁnancial markets.27
As throughout the nineteenth century, the incentives for banks to multinational-
ise were strongly related to the economic expansion of industrialised countries into
peripheral areas, either as commercial penetration or direct investment. This created
increasing scope for banks – sometimes as leaders, more often as followers28 – to
provide trade ﬁnance and foreign-exchange services to local national customers.
Competition in multinational retail banking in ‘core’ countries was limited, gener-
ally ill-planned and unsuccessful.29 The increasing presence of European (and from
1913 American) banks was concentrated in peripheral areas. There, besides trade
ﬁnance, opportunities arose to provide investment-banking services to colonial and
foreign governments issuing debt on major ﬁnancial markets, or to collect deposits
and manage national emigrants’ remittances. In some cases, foreign institutions
became gradually ‘naturalised’, diversifying into local retail banking services (a
strategy that provided a safeguard against adverse foreign-exchange ﬂuctuations).
Such ‘ﬁnancial pioneering’ often became an active factor of ﬁnancial modernisation.
This ‘foreign dominance’ pattern of transnational banking – largely based upon
the creation of specialist overseas banks responding to the ‘gravitational pull eﬀect’
while the British authorities maintained an informal embargo on foreign loans and did not discon-
tinue the practice of consultation with issuing houses even after the lifting of capital controls in
1925: see P. Einzig, The Fight for Financial Supremacy (London, 1931), pp. 41–2; and J. M. Atkin,
‘Oﬃcial regulation of British overseas investment, 1914–1931’, Economic History Review, 23 (1970).
27 For an illustration of the eclectic model of multinational banks’ growth, see J. M. Gray and H. P.
Gray, ‘The multinational bank: a ﬁnancial MNC?’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 5 (1981); and
K. R. Cho, Multinational Banks. Their Identities and Determinants (Ann Arbor, MI, 1985), pp. 55–75.
28 C. P. Kindleberger, ‘International banks as leaders or followers of international business. An
historical perspective’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 7 (1983), p. 592, argues that, when banks
were aggressive in building world networks and industry focused on single projects and defensive
investments, banks were likely to be leaders and industrial companies followers, and vice versa.
29 The distinction between multinational retail banking, multinational service banking and multi-
national wholesale banking is drawn by H. G. Grubel, ‘A theory of multinational banking’, BNL
Quarterly Review, 123, 31 (1977). On British and American banks’ foreign branches in Europe, see
G. Jones, ‘Lombard Street on the Riviera: the British clearing banks and Europe 1900–1960’,
Business History, 24 (1982); idem, British Multinational Banking 1830–1990 (Oxford, 1993), pp. 71–3;
and T. Balderston, ‘German banking between the wars: the crisis of the credit banks’, Business
History Review, 65 (1991).148 financial history review
exercised by national trade30 – reached its apex during the ﬁrst three decades of the
twentieth century. Then the dominance of British ‘free-standing’ overseas banks
(partially consolidated into international banking arms of major clearing banks)31
had been eroded, especially within Latin America and the Far East. It arose from the
activities of French and German commercial banks (often backed, or oﬃcially
sponsored, by their respective governments),32 and of aggressive American commer-
cial banks, freed from binding regulation that had previously prevented them from
developing a large acceptance market and overseas branches.33 The European peri-
phery (the Mediterranean basin, the Balkans and eastern Europe) was a privileged
area for the expansion of continental universal or ‘cre ´dit-mobilier model’ banks.
This was mainly undertaken through joint subsidiaries to assist corporate customers’
direct investments or to provide ‘mixed bank’ services to emerging local industry –
an aspect absent (or weaker) within ‘imperial’ areas, where ﬁnancing other than for
trade was limited to railways and public utilities.34 Overall, the ‘foreign dominance’
pattern of transnational expansion involved the play of net ownership-speciﬁc
advantages (not only size but also the existence of a customer-base with
internationally- or multinationally-oriented activities, high reputation, solid mana-
gerial resources, cumulated experience and information capital, and access to capital
resources at favourable conditions). These were successfully combined with speciﬁc
location advantages related to trade and direct investments between host and home
country.
Diﬀerent (though to some extent correlated) incentives motivated all major
30 See J. Metais, ‘Les processus de multinationalisation des grandes banques commerciales. Une
approche en terme d’e ´conomie industrielle’, Revue Economique, 3, 30 (1979).
31 The reference text is Jones, British Multinational Banking, pp. 30–62 and 92–102; see also idem,
‘British overseas banks as free-standing companies, 1830–1996’, in M. Wilkins and H. Schro ¨ter
(eds), The Free-Standing Company in the World Economy 1830–1996 (Oxford, 1998).
32 See P. Hertner, ‘German banks abroad before 1914’, in G. Jones (ed.), Banks as Multinationals
(London, 1990); and R. Tilly, ‘International aspects of the development of German banking’, in
Cameron and Bovykin, International Banking.
33 Before 1914 only a few trust companies and international banking corporations had established
foreign branches in London and Paris. On international activities of US banks before the Federal
Reserve Act, see V. P. Carosso and R. Sylla, ‘US banks in international ﬁnance’, in Cameron and
Bovykin, International Banking. On the rapid expansion of overseas branching in the 1920s, see
T. F. Huertas, ‘US multinational banking: history and prospects’, in Jones, Banks and Multinationals,
pp. 248–53; and H. van B. Cleveland and T. F. Huertas, Citibank 1812–1970 (Cambridge, MA,
1985). A general perspective is given in P. P. Abrahams, The Foreign Expansion of American Finance
and its Relationship to the Foreign Economic Policies of the United States, 1907–1921 (New York, 1976).
34 See H. Bonin, ‘The case of the French banks’; H. Van der Wee and M. Goossens, ‘Belgium’; and
B. V. Anan‘ich and V. I. Bovykin, ‘Foreign banks and foreign investments in Russia’, all in
Cameron and Bovykin, International Banking; P. L. Cottrell, ‘Aspects of Western equity investment
in the banking systems of East Central Europe’, in A. Teichova and P. L. Cottrell (eds), International
Business and Central Europe, 1918–1939 (Leicester, 1983); and R. Di Quirico, ‘The initial phases of
Italian banks’ expansion abroad, 1900–31’, Financial History Review, 6, 1 (1999). A good counter-
example is Brazil: see M. B. Levy, ‘The banking system and foreign capital in Brazil’, in Cameron
and Bovikyn, International Banking.149 golden ages of international banking
American and European banks to establish branches or subsidiaries in major ﬁnancial
centres (London and Paris before 1914; New York thereafter). A direct presence
here was instrumental for gaining direct access to information and economic intelli-
gence, foreign-exchange and trade facilities and, not least, for winning a reputation
as a bank of truly international standing. Beyond locational advantages, branching
in London and Paris allowed banks to internalise foreign-exchange functions, to
engage more eﬃciently in interest and exchange arbitrage and to operate more
discreetly in the market. The latter aspect was particularly relevant in the light of
functional links with a home country’s monetary policy. Commercial banks’ foreign
branches often managed part of the exchange reserves and intervened, as agents of
their respective national monetary authorities, on the foreign exchanges and capital
markets in order to inﬂuence the exchange of the domestic currency and the course
of their respective government’s foreign debt.35 Branches in international ﬁnancial
centres were therefore mainly motivated by internalisation advantages, combined
with those speciﬁcally of location, such as the direct acquisition of expertise of
process and product innovations, and direct access to network linkages.36
From 1890 to 1914, in the absence of systemic instability and binding regulation,
ﬁnancial innovation in international banking was essentially a responsive to a short-
age of international medium of exchange or to ﬁnancial crisis. These occurred along
with a structural change, marked by the decline of specialised institutions, such as
British acceptance houses, continental haute banques and private merchant banks. In
all major countries, amalgamation led to large joint-stock banks providing a wide
range of services domestically and to an increasingly extent internationally. These
institutions developed foreign networks of branches and transnational relationships
and, eventually, established their leadership in international ﬁnance. International
banking during the ﬁrst three decades of the twentieth century was a long-term
consequence of the revolution over the nineteenth century brought about by the
rise of deposit-banking systems. It was, therefore, increasingly characterised by the
emergence of new techniques for ﬁnancing international trade, conducting foreign-
exchange banking and transacting international interbank dealings, which shaped
the modern system of international ‘correspondent’ banking.
During the late nineteenth century, sterling bills became the fundamental vehicle
of international liquidity, not only employed to ﬁnance international trade but also
35 For the Italian case, see M. De Cecco (ed.), L’Italia e il sistema ﬁnanziario internationale 1861–1914
(Rome, 1992); and M. D’Alessandro, ‘L’organizzazione delle reti estere Comit e Credit nei centri
ﬁnanziari internazionali (1910–1935)’, Archivi e Imprese, 9 (1998).
36 M. Casson, ‘Evolution of multinational banks: a theoretical perspective’, in Jones, Banks as
Multinationals, pp. 19–20. Beneﬁts from internalisation are expected to vary across banks, according
to diﬀerent level of ownership-speciﬁc advantages as well as to diﬀerences in business operated.
Usually more information-oriented activities (such as borrowing and lending) are supposed to oﬀer
greater opportunities for internalisation beneﬁts than less information-oriented business lines (such
as providing letters of credit for international trade). The point is emphasised by Cho, Multinational
Banks, p. 60.150 financial history review
held by banks as liquid reserve investments.37 The decline of ‘inland’ bills was more
than compensated by the rise of ‘foreign bills’, which made the market increasingly
international. From the early 1890s, a new secular rise occurred in the London
discount market’s volume, which by 1914 exceeded the peak attained 40 years
earlier.38 Despite increased competition from French and German banks in trade
ﬁnance and their successful attempts to create ‘naturalised’ acceptance markets in
francs and marks,39 it is argued that London retained a dominant role until the 1931
crisis. This was thanks to low interest rates, narrow spreads and its money market’s
high liquidity.40 However, major structural changes were also occurring in trade
ﬁnance through overdrafts and telegraphic transfers replacing commercial bills
(associated with mail transfers). These innovations were fostered by trade’s sustained
growth, improvements in communication technologies and the rising power of
large commercial banks as determined competitors in international intermediation
(also in Britain, where previously they had merely provided liquid short-term funds
to merchants, discount houses and bill brokers).41
The diﬀusion of credit instruments in trade ﬁnance had a major impact upon
foreign-exchange dealings, which increasingly hinged upon foreign balances held
with correspondents on a basis of reciprocity. While foreign-exchange turnover
required by trade and capital accounts transactions grew incessantly, traditional
dealings declined. Transactions at the Royal Exchange, London (and other similar
formal markets in continental centres where dealers and brokers periodically met)
lost their role. Conﬁdence in exchange stability and the rising volume of business
motivated commercial banks at leading centres to keep permanent balances with
their correspondents for their foreign-exchange business. They accepted informal
transfers from such balances as the basis for exchange transactions even with banks
in the Americas or the Far East, and granted mutual overdraft facilities in their own
37 Gallarotti, The Anatomy, pp. 29–30.
38 C. Goodhart, The Business of Banking 1891–1914 (Aldershot, 1986), pp. 144–8; and S. Nishimura,
The Decline of Inland Bills of Exchange in the London Money Market 1855–1913 (Cambridge, 1971),
pp. 11–25.
39 On the emerging role of the French franc and the mark as international key-currencies, see P.
Lindert, Key Currencies and Gold 1900–1913, Princeton Studies in International Finance, 24
(Princeton, 1969). On the German challenge to British leadership in international acceptances, see
S. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (London, 1984), pp. 121–5.
40 Einzig, The Fight for Financial Supremacy, pp. 26–48.
41 Although on the eve of the First World War 7 major merchant banks still accounted for nearly half
the accepting credit business carried out in London, joint-stock banks had conquered a substantial
market share after their relatively late entry in the 1890s. See Chapman, The Rise, pp. 104–8; P.
Cottrell, ‘The domestic commercial banks and the City of London, 1870–1939’, in Y. Cassis (ed.),
Finance and Financiers in European History 1880–1960 (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 50–3; and idem, ‘Aspects
of commercial banking in northern and central Europe, 1880–1931’, in S. Kinsey and L. Newton
(eds), International Banking in an Age of Transition (Aldershot, 1998), pp. 119–29. De Cecco, Money
and Empire, pp. 127–70, considers the crisis of 1914 as the ultimate manifestation of joint-stock
banks’ bid for hegemony over City merchants as international intermediaries.151 golden ages of international banking
currencies.42 This rapidly brought about the consolidation of the international
system of ‘nostro’ accounts, which allowed banks to access foreign-currency bal-
ances held with correspondents abroad, sometimes covered against exchange risk.43
During the early 1920s foreign-exchange markets in the modern sense emerged
in all major ﬁnancial centres, based upon telephone connections between commer-
cial banks’ foreign-exchange departments and minor brokers.44 Modern foreign-
exchange banking, however, also implied a higher risk for banks acting as principals.
Consequently, they quoted ﬁrm rates rather than operating as brokers (i.e. charging
customers the rate obtained in the market with a commission added). In this new
capacity, banks enabled customers to save the costs of obtaining information on
market prices and to avoid higher uncertainty and risk implied by alternative
methods.45 They also lent their names to customers’ transactions, generally
obtaining better conditions (especially in the case of small industrial and commercial
ﬁrms).46 Modern foreign-exchange banking, based on ‘nostro’ accounts and corres-
pondent relationships, aided the processing, and sharing, of exchange risk through
operating as an informal cooperative process of risk management, based upon
bilateral arrangements and motivated by mutual interests in liquidity supply.47
The development of interbank relationships, motivated by foreign exchange, also
created further scope for the emancipation of interbank transactions from trade
ﬁnance. Indeed, from the 1890s the search for new vehicle instruments for interbank
dealings, together with short-term capital ﬂows, led to the rise of ‘ﬁnance’ bills,
usually drawn against the deposit of securities or the borrowing bank’s general
creditworthiness. These international short-term borrowings caused a marked
upward shift in the average size of transactions, as well as an increasing
standardisation and sophistication of exchange-rate quotations for diﬀerent bill
42 P. Einzig, The History of Foreign Exchanges (London, 1970), pp. 179–80. British clearing banks made
a late entry, whereas large commercial banks on the continent developed foreign-exchange banking
functions much earlier.
43 With the development of the ‘nostro’ account system, sterling, French franks or marks acquired by
foreign banks in the course of foreign exchange dealings were therefore held with London, Paris or
Berlin banks. Rates allowed on credit balances (i.e. net credit positions) and charged on overdrafts
(i.e. net debt positions) could be ﬁxed until further notice or varied automatically according to
oﬃcial discount rate. Excess credit balances could be invested in other local money market securities
(such as Treasury bills) in order to get a higher return. On ‘nostro’ accounts, see P. Einzig, A
Dynamic Theory of Forward Exchange (London, 1967), pp. 47–8.
44 Einzig, History of Foreign Exchange, pp. 238–9.
45 As an alternative, customers could instruct the bank to buy or sell ‘at best’ or at some maximum or
minimum rate. Both these methods, however, implied substantial uncertainty as to the extent to
which foreign-exchange dealing would aﬀect proﬁt margins of commercial transactions, or high
risk that the bank might ﬁnd it impossible to deal at max-minimum rate set by customers.
46 Thus some contracts included also a guarantee under which (similar to acceptances) banks
substituted their standing for that of their customers: see Einzig, A Dynamic Theory, pp. 20–3.
47 Risk arose from the fact that, when engaging in foreign-currency banking, banks found themselves
cut oﬀ from their domestic liquidity support arrangements: see Davis and Lewis, Domestic and
International, p. 341.152 financial history review
maturities.48 ‘Finance’ bills gained a dominant role in London (up to 60 per cent of
prime bank acceptances outstanding in 1913). Nishimura has estimated that growth
from the mid-1890s was principally due to the use of ﬁnance bills.49 Their expansion
was mainly driven by arbitrage opportunities, arising from interest-rate diﬀerentials
between money markets (made, in turn, more eﬃcient by enhanced communi-
cation). At times, they also provided an important source of liquidity to banks
suﬀering from domestic credit restraint – as well as a proﬁtable outlet for excess
liquidity – also in the absence of favourable market rates.50
By 1914, the ‘ﬁnance’-bill system had developed into something akin to a whole-
sale international interbank market, based upon correspondent networks linking the
United States,51 the United Kingdom and the continent,52 and functioning as a
channel of international liquidity distribution. ‘Finance’ bills, however, had only
limited ﬂexibility and were increasingly replaced by direct interbank short-term
borrowing and lending through deposits and advances. Such practice probably
reached its mature development during the 1920s, when volatile interest and
exchange rates led banks to resort to more ﬂexible and eﬃcient techniques of
foreign-exchange liquidity management, which substantially enhanced their
elasticity to opportunities for arbitrage and speculation.53
48 Traditionally, exchange rates for bills included interest charges. At the mid-century such charges
were allowed for only approximately. From the 1870s, the practice of the market evolved towards
quotations for ‘usance’ maturities (regardless of the actual maturities of bills) – 30 days for bills on
Paris and Geneva, one month for Germany and Holland, two months for New York, three months
for Italy and South America: see Einzig, History of Foreign Exchange, pp. 175–6.
49 Bloomﬁeld, Short-Term Capital Movements; and Nishimura, The Decline, pp. 105–15.
50 Nishimura gives evidence that ﬁnance bills (contrary to commercial, or ‘real’ bills) generally showed
a negative correlation to both the absolute level of interest rates in London and the diﬀerentials
between London and other relevant ﬁnancial centres. In fact, the volume of ﬁnance bills tended to
decrease when discount rates in London were high and interest diﬀerentials (that is, scope for
arbitrage) narrow, and vice versa. There were exceptions to this, however, as it was the case in the
1906–07 boom (which induced banks to raise funds in London in spite of high rates), and in the
ensuing depression (when low rates in London did not induce any signiﬁcant surge in borrowing,
whereas British banks were far from keen to lend abroad): see Nishimura, The Decline, pp. 70–1.
51 ‘Finance’ bills were drawn in substantial volumes by American banks upon London banks, especially
during periods of rising interest rates in the USA and booming stock-market activity (as in
1905–06). On the use of ﬁnance bills on London by American banks, see C. Goodhart, The New
York Money Market and the Finance of Trade, 1900–1913 (Cambridge, MA, 1969). Chapman’s sources
give further evidence of the connection of ﬁnance bills with stock-exchange speculation: see
Chapman, The Rise, pp. 123–4.
52 Also German and Russian banks engaged in sizeable transactions with correspondents both in
London and Paris, whereas French banks used to grant short-term foreign credits to German,
Russian and other European correspondents through diﬀerent techniques. Bloomﬁeld’s sources
report French banks as the most intensively engaged in the so-called ‘bill pensioning‘, under which
borrowing banks obtained short-term funds from abroad by discounting part of their domestic bill
portfolio with foreign banks under repurchase agreements at the same exchange rate.
53 See Eichengreen, Globalising Capital, pp. 51–72. Also Einzig, The Fight for Financial Supremacy,
pp. 94–101; and United Nations, International Capital Movements (New York, 1949), pp. 21–3.153 golden ages of international banking
The 1920s also saw the emergence of modern forward markets to cover against
increased risk in trade and ﬁnancial transactions. Throughout the nineteenth century
merchants and bankers had covered this by means of bills of the same maturity.54
This required a large turnover of short-term lending and borrowing transactions and
became increasingly costly as the volume of business requiring cover increased. The
organisation of systematic and standardised markets for forward exchange trans-
actions helped lower cost and improve eﬃciency. Nonetheless, progress was slow
and controversial. Due to high conﬁdence in gold parities, exchange risk was
generally perceived as modest and foreseeable – at least for ‘core’ currencies.
Consequently, uncovered interest arbitrage was considered the rule under the classi-
cal gold standard. Transactions were covered in the forward market only during
periods of exchange uncertainty or when currencies of doubtful reputation were
involved (such as the ruble and the Austrian crown).55
British importers and exporters, as well as their bankers, had little need to require
forward exchange facilities since they usually made and received payments in ster-
ling. Foreign importers and exporters eﬃciently covered exchange risk in sterling
forward markets that rapidly developed at all major ﬁnancial centres.56 The emerg-
ence of forward exchange markets was also delayed by widespread distrust - within
public opinion and the press - of what was often regarded as a mere speculative
device.
Many organisational and technical experiments failed. Special clearing houses
were unsuccessfully tested in Paris and Amsterdam after 1918, and special ‘put and
call’ forward contracts were introduced in New York only to be soon abandoned.
A critical boost to developments came from the currency turmoil of the early 1920s,
which induced even the most conservative banks to meet their customers’ growing
demand for forward facilities. By the general return to gold during the second half
of the decade, modern forward exchange markets, based upon telephone networks
linking foreign-exchange departments of most large commercial and ‘universal’
banks, were operating in all major ﬁnancial centres. Covering against exchange risk
on commercial transactions and the banks’ own net positions in foreign exchange
was extended to all currencies and became ordinary business practice.
Strictly related to modern forward dealings was the emergence, under the
interwar gold-exchange standard, of a further major innovation - systematic inter-
national interbank borrowing of key-currencies, based upon ‘swap’ contracts. These
54 A merchant or a banker with payments due in foreign currency in an overseas centre usually bought
foreign bills of the required maturity. Similarly, a merchant or a banker expecting future payments
in foreign currency used to hedge against the risk of depreciation by drawing and selling a bill
denominated in that currency and of the required maturity.
55 Bloomﬁeld, Short-Term Capital Movements, pp. 38–43. This also helps explain why forward trans-
actions before 1914 were relatively less developed in London than on the continent (especially in
Vienna and Berlin, whereby the functioning of forward markets was reported from the 1880s as a
side-facility to intense stock arbitrage): see Einzig, A Dynamic Theory, pp. 31–60.
56 Einzig, History of Foreign Exchange, pp. 181–3; and more extensively, idem, A Dynamic Theory,
pp. 5-32.154 financial history review
allowed central banks, as well as commercial banks, of soft-currency countries –
mainly in central and eastern Europe but also in France and Latin America – to
obtain temporary holdings of sterling and dollar deposits, often subject to automatic
renewal. Lenders, primarily British and American banks, could earn very high proﬁt
margins with no exchange risk.57 At the same time, the London money market’s
facilities were integrated by the development of a limited market in short-term
currency-denominated deposits and loans, which allowed banks to borrow and lend
in dollars or Reichmarks with virtually no restriction.58 These practices can be
legitimately held as the closest historical antecedent of the Eurodollar market that
shaped postwar international banking.
In international investment banking, innovations were fundamentally a response
to the 1890 crisis. The most important was the adoption of underwriting syndicate
arrangements.
The period between the 1890s and the 1920s recorded the peak in capital outﬂow
from Western countries, measured as a percentage of GDP, mainly comprising
portfolio investment.59 Investors in surplus countries, such as the United Kingdom
(from 1860), France and Germany (from 1880), and the United States (from the
mid-1890s to 1905, and again during the 1920s), purchased long-term international
securities. These were primarily ﬁxed-interest bonds and debentures (75 per cent of
the aggregate capital called during the pre-1914 period in the British case). They
were issued principally by central and local governments and railway companies,
with yields generally higher than those on domestic substitutes.60 As usual, capital
57 In foreign exchanges, a swap contract implies a purchase (or sale) of a currency in the spot market
against a simultaneous sale (or purchase) in the forward market. The swap rate is the diﬀerence
between the spot and the forward rate at which the currency is traded. The exchange risk is covered
since the forward rate is assumed to reﬂect possible depreciation or revaluation expectations. Einzig
refers to such practice as ‘swap-and-deposit’ transactions. The terms of the contracts depended on
whether local commercial banks acted either as principals or as mere intermediaries between foreign
banks and the central bank. Einzig also describes a number of cases in which central banks in
Europe and Latin America used swap transactions as a means of acquiring foreign exchange
resources: see P. Einzig, History of Foreign Exchange, p. 242; and idem, A Dynamic Theory, pp. 422–3,
441–4, 460–3. See also P. Cottrell (with C. J. Stone), ‘Credits, and deposits to ﬁnance credits’, in
P. L. Cottrell, H. Lindgren and A. Teichova (eds), European Industry and Banking Between the Wars:
A Review of Bank-Industry Relations (Leicester, 1992); and T. Balderston, ‘The banks and the gold
standard in the German ﬁnancial crisis of 1931’, Financial History Review, 1 (1994).
58 Einzig, The Fight for Financial Supremacy, p. 46.
59 Recent statistical evidence in Bordo, Eichengreen and Kim, ‘Was there really’, p. 37.
60 The classic work on the subject remains H. Feis, Europe: The World’s Banker (New Haven, 1930).
For a general quantitative picture, A. Bloomﬁeld, Patterns of Fluctuation in International Investment
Before 1914, Princeton Studies in International Finance, 21 (Princeton, 1968); and A. Green and
M. C. Urquhart, ‘Factor and commodity ﬂows in the international economy of 1870–1914: a
multi-country view’, Journal of Economic History, 36 (1976). Figures of capital exports from Britain
(originally collected by G. Paish, L. Jenks and M. Simon) and their geographical and functional
distribution have undergone a number of revisions: see D. C. M. Platt, Britain’s Investment Overseas
on the Eve of the First World War. The Use and Abuse of Numbers (London, 1986); and I. Stone, The
Global Export of Capital from Great Britain, 1865–1914: A Statistical Survey (London, 1999). A review155 golden ages of international banking
raising by foreign sovereign and corporate borrowers on the industrialised countries’
ﬁnancial markets occurred in waves – from the early 1890s to the war and, again,
during the short-lived period of the gold-exchange standard of the 1920s – each
followed by an insolvency crisis and, ultimately, default.61 Each ‘boom-and-bust’
cycle resulted in ex post charges against bankers of excessive loan pushing and
disaster-myopia,62 and complaints over investors’ irrational behaviour.
The Baring crisis marked the beginnings of a structural change in the ‘issuing
industry’. The dominant position enjoyed by a few merchant banks and haute
banques (based on large international networks of agents, ‘friends’ and ‘allied’ private
bankers and other institutions) was increasingly challenged. As in other business
ﬁelds, this came from the rising power of commercial banks in the United Kingdom
and on the continent. The allotment of foreign bonds began to rely less on the
placing power of individual banks’ networks than underwriting syndicates, managed
by smaller merchant competitors and encompassing a large number of banks, ﬁnan-
cial institutions (trustees, debenture and insurance companies, dealers) and foreign
banks.63
The importance of syndicates was hardly a novelty; their ﬁrst appearance can be
traced to the Napoleonic wars, although the practice was abandoned in Britain to
such an extent that, as Chapman observes, in City mythology they were regarded
as a peculiarly American and German invention. Their role increased again with the
‘boom-and-bust’ issuing cycle of the late 1880s. The Baring crisis (in which default
on Argentinian loans was a demonstration of the rising risk on the traditional
practice of independent single-house management of issues) contributed.
Furthermore, substantial losses of market share persuaded even the elite market
leaders (such as Rothschilds, Barings and Schroders), who had tended to consider
syndication as a last resort practice. During the renewed ‘issuing fever’ of the early
twentieth century, therefore, the reputation and marketability of foreign bonds
depended very much on the placing power guaranteed by large international
of available estimates for France and Germany is in K. E. Born, International Banking in the 19th and
20th Century (Leamington, 1983), pp. 119–35; and Platt, Britain’s Investment Overseas, pp. 131–9.
61 See B. Stallings, Banker to the World. US Portfolio Investment in Latin America, 1900–1986 (Berkeley,
1987), pp. 58–83; B. Eichengreen and R. Portes, ‘After the deluge: default, negotiations and
readjustment during the interwar years’, and E. Jorgensen and J. Sachs, ‘Default and renegotiation
of Latin American bonds in the interwar period’, both in B. Eichengreen and P. Lindert (eds), The
International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA, 1989), pp. 13–85; and D. H.
Aldcroft, ‘International lending, debtor countries and the Great Depression’, in idem, Studies in the
Interwar European Economy (Aldershot, 1997).
62 That is, technical inability to evaluate accurately both borrowers’ and banks’ exposure to external
shocks: see J. M. Guttentag and R. J. Herring, ‘Disaster myopia in international banking’, Essays in
International Finance, 164, International Finance Section, Princeton University (1986).
63 R. Cameron, ‘The growth of international banking to 1914’, in K. L. Holtfrerich (ed.), Interactions
in the World Economy (London, 1989), pp. 204–5.156 financial history review
syndicates. Their characteristics had increasingly evolved from ad hoc combinations
towards more formal and comprehensive arrangements.64
Recent studies emphasise the crucial role performed by merchant bankers as
information providers (through their networks of foreign agents, commission rep-
resentatives and emissaries) to overcome information barriers. Without oﬃcial regu-
lation over the production and dissemination of ﬁnancial information by issuers, it
is argued that banks not only provided information to investors and signalled bor-
rowers’ creditworthiness – sometimes even by establishing rating departments – but
also developed functions of monitoring loans and preventing free riding.65
However, a question arises over the extent to which such a conceptual scheme can
be applied to a period of increasing competition and diﬀusion of underwriting
syndicates. Syndicates were meant to guarantee borrowers against the risk of adverse
market conditions and to allow banks, acting as residual buyers and thus bearing a
fee-earning contingent liability risk, to share credit and default risk and reduce it by
means of diversiﬁcation. Large-scale syndication and underwriting contracts rep-
resented, therefore, a protective ﬁnancial innovation, based upon mutual insurance
and aimed at maximising business volume and minimising contingent liability risk
(and the related need of additional liquid resources) assumed individually by partici-
pants.66 These institutional arrangements can also be interpreted as a response of
banks, often new entrants, to diﬃculties in solving the problems of asymmetric
information due to rapidly growing business volume, poor information available
(especially for new borrowers), and ﬁerce competition.
In prewar London, ﬁnancial commentators complained about falling quality
standards in foreign bond business, the general decline of ‘the old prudence and
caution’ and the ‘old regard for the public interest’ typical of long-established
ﬁnancial houses.67 These sentiments reﬂected the swarm of new underwriters and
the enlargement of syndicates to embrace discount houses, joint-stock banks and
foreign banks which simply created ‘an illusion of security’, merely instrumental in
‘puﬃng’ issues to a premium. Cases of issues unloaded on to investors only at high
discount or returned to underwriters and held in their portfolios were reported to
have mushroomed, while requiring a growing provision of short-term loans by
64 Cottrell, ‘Great Britain’, pp. 37–40; and Chapman, The Rise, pp. 88–103 and 155–61. On the
international connections of British, French and German banks see also Born, International Banking,
pp. 115–59.
65 Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin, ‘Is globalisation today’, pp. 33–5. The role of banks in ﬁnancial
systems characterised by asymmetric information is emphasised by F. S. Mishkin, ‘International
capital movements, ﬁnancial volatility and ﬁnancial instability’, NBER Working Paper, 6390 (1998).
According to Bordo, Eichengreen and Kim, ‘Was there really’, pp. 15–18, asymmetric information
account for investments concentrating on securities issued by entities with highly tangible and
transparent assets. Similarly, bonds allowed investors to overcome agency problems.
66 See Davis and Lewis, Domestic and International, pp. 346–7.
67 ‘The result is that men have ceased to feel individual responsibility, each is but one of a set, and is
only to a comparatively small extent liable either in purse or in reputation for what is done’: The
Statist (1888), quoted in Chapman, The Rise, pp. 157–8.157 golden ages of international banking
commercial banks to avoid intolerable liquidity strain.68 Similarly, during the ‘lend-
ing fever’ of the 1920s, triggered by the ‘false feeling of security and stability created
by the stabilisation of a number of countries’, bankers were accused of unduly
‘pushing’ the explosive growth of foreign capital issues in New York69 and London,
thus privileging volume rather than quality.70 Many blamed as ill-fated the trans-
formation of investment banking into a cut-throat competitive business. It was
apparently based upon aggressive marketing strategies – a feature largely absent from
the prewar collusion-biased arrangements – with little regard paid for either the
beneﬁt of borrowers (especially in the case of default-prone developing countries)
or the security of investors.71 American bankers’ performance in monitoring and
commitment was generally felt to have been poor, especially when compared to
what was perceived as a much more careful scrutiny of foreign issues by the
unoﬃcial syndicate of London issuing houses.72 The British interwar experience
(with relatively few default cases) was, therefore, regarded as a case of informal
cooperative management that had enhanced information circulation and collective
monitoring, thus limiting risk and preventing major losses.
III
During the post-1945 ‘golden age’ of Western capitalism, the revival of international
banking, motivated by increasing international economic interdependence, had to
overcome the longue dure ´e of the reforms of the 1930s and 1940s that had made
banking in all major countries an over-regulated sector. A number of factors con-
tributed to reduce the scope for growth in domestic banking. These included central
banks’ control over monetary policy through market-oriented or administrative
constraints (reserve requirements, ceilings on interest rates and credit expansion,
68 Platt, Britain’s Investment, pp. 141–5. He reports also that hints of evasion and fraud were often
circulated by the ﬁnancial press.
69 Competition was brought about by American banks, that had developed syndicating networks with
bondholders to sell war-eﬀort Treasury bonds, and regarded international banking and multinational
expansion as a solution to declining domestic business and adverse institutional developments. On
the evolution of the US banking system after the Federal Reserve Act, see E. N. White, The
Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System, 1900–1929 (Princeton, 1981); and Cleveland
and Huertas, Citibank.
70 ‘Loans were granted to provinces whose very existence was unknown until their names appeared
on the prospectus. Every device of supreme salesmanship was made use of in order to place foreign
bonds with an ignorant and indiscriminate investing public’: see P. Einzig, World Finance 1914–1935
(New York, 1935), pp. 148–9; and idem, The Fight for Financial Supremacy, pp. 52–4.
71 See M. De Cecco, ‘The international debt problem in the interwar period’, EUI Working Paper,
103 (1984); B. Eichengreen and R. Portes, ‘Debt and default in the 1930s: causes and consequences’,
European Economic Review, 30 (1986); and A. Fishlow, ‘Lessons from the past: capital markets during
the nineteenth century and the interwar period’, International Organisation, 39 (1985).
72 On sentiments prevailing among contemporary observers, see M. Winkler, Foreign Bonds. An
Autopsy (Philadelphia, 1933); and J. Madden, M. Nadler and H. Sauvain, America’s Experience as a
Creditor Nation (New York, 1937).158 financial history review
directives for discriminatory credit allocation, capital-to-asset ratios). This went
along with ‘ﬁscal dominance’ brought about by military defence and the welfare
state, banking laws setting legal boundaries between specialised activities and the
general prevalence of oligopolistic structures in banking systems.
In many European countries specialised public institutions were established to
provide trade ﬁnance services and support exports. Transnational expansion was also
hindered by scarce enthusiasm for foreign banks’ entry into national systems, justi-
ﬁed by the necessity to protect domestic oligopolies from competition, or to
reinforce the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. A common trend towards relaxation
of regulatory discrimination in all OECD countries only emerged during the 1970s
but restrictive attitudes were far from uncommon among Western monetary auth-
orities and continued to prevail in many developing countries.73 Similarly, foreign
borrowers’ access to national capital markets was subject to strict regulation – major
exceptions being Zurich before 1961 and New York before 196374 – while
foreign-exchange and capital controls prevented investors in many countries from
purchasing foreign securities.
How was it that international banking re-emerged from such an adverse environ-
ment to experience during the 1970s what is usually referred to as its ‘golden era’?
The rationale for its powerful expansion from the 1960s lay in the ability of large
commercial banks of Western countries to exploit the regulatory asymmetries that
developed within the international system. A strong incentive was the rapidly
expanding demand for services that stemmed from the sustained growth of trade
and multinational corporations’ substantial foreign direct investments.75 The emerg-
ence of the Eurodollar (and other Eurocurrencies) market,76 a truly international
money market for time deposits denominated in foreign currencies, laid the foun-
dations for the ensuing explosion of international lending, either as medium-term
bank loans or long-term bond issues.
A crucial factor was the gradual relaxation of foreign-exchange controls after the
return to external convertibility by all major Western currencies at the end of 1958.
This allowed banks greater ﬂexibility in their management of exchange treasuries
and foreign portfolios, and revived the ‘correspondent banking’ system, frozen since
the 1930s. International institutions (such as Bank for International Settlements),
and the monetary authorities of some European surplus countries (Bundesbank and
Bank of Italy), actively encouraged commercial banks to expand their activity in
73 On multinationalisation of banking in OECD countries, see R. M. Pecchioli, The Internationalisation
of Banking. The Policy Issues (Paris, 1983), pp. 68–84. On developing countries, see United Nations
Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Banks: Operations, Strategies and Their EVects in
Developing Countries (New York, 1981).
74 See P. Einzig, Foreign Dollar Loans in Europe (London, 1965), pp. 33–40.
75 See R. C. Bryant, International Financial Intermediation (Washington, DC, 1987), pp. 58–73.
76 Eurodollars are time deposits of short maturity denominated in dollars and held with banks outside
the USA (including foreign branches of US banks), initially mainly in Europe. Analogously,
Eurocurrencies are time deposits denominated in any given currency and held with banks outside
that currency’s country. Eurocurrency markets are therefore ‘external’ markets.159 golden ages of international banking
foreign currencies. They made available part of their dollar reserves for these
purposes through swap contracts, in order to improve international liquidity, oﬀset
the expansionary impact of payment surpluses upon the domestic monetary base, as
well as to allow cheap trade ﬁnance to national industry.77 Finally, the willingness
of the British authorities to revive London’s heyday as an international ﬁnancial
centre created a deregulated enclave that acted as a powerful magnet to attract
international banking back to the City. The free entry of foreign banks was allowed,
with no regulation over the business conducted in foreign currencies (since it did
not aﬀect directly domestic monetary conditions).78
The emergence of rapidly growing ‘external’ money and capital Euromarkets
critically enhanced ﬁnancial integration amongst all major OECD countries. It
made national monetary conditions increasingly interdependent and short-term
capital ﬂows channelled by commercial banks more sensitive and elastic to proﬁt
opportunities stemming from interest-rate and currency arbitrage. During the late
1960s, under the Bretton Woods system of ‘adjustable exchange-rate peg’ (that
actually imposed adjustment through parity changes on reluctant governments),
monetary authorities in the United States and continental Europe were induced to
introduce new capital controls and regulatory devices on banks. This was in an
attempt to sterilise the consequences of ﬁnancial interdependence upon the balance
of payments, domestic monetary conditions and exchange parities.79 It, in turn,
further motivated banks to ‘externalise’ international business in Eurocurrency
centres and to devise new ﬁnancial innovations to circumvent regulations and
constraints. It was a ‘regulatory dialectic’ that boosted the Euromarkets’ growth
until the late 1970s, when all major Western countries (the United States, United
Kingdom and West Germany) began to lift controls and regulations.
The new upsurge of international banking coincided with the Eurocurrency
system. It was a true revolution that had, as Podolski has argued, an impact
77 Dollars made available through swaps from central banks were placed with foreign banks, or used
to ﬁnance international trade of domestic customers. Italian banks were also reported to bid actively
for currency deposits with European correspondents to ﬁnance international trade of their national
customers at cheaper conditions than those prevailing domestically. See O. L. Altman, ‘Foreign
markets for dollars, sterling, and other currencies’, IMF StaV Papers, 4 (1961); and idem, ‘Recent
developments in foreign markets for dollars and other currencies’, IMF StaV Papers, 1 (1963).
78 See J. H. Forsyth, ‘Financial innovation in Britain’, in M. De Cecco (ed.), Changing Money. Financial
Innovation in Developed Countries (London, 1987), pp. 144–9; E. Helleiner, States and the Reemergence
of Global Finance. From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY, 1994), pp. 83–91; and G. Burn, ‘The
state, the City and the Euromarkets’, Review of International Political Economy, 6 (1999). A partial
exception was represented by UK clearing banks, whose foreign currency business was subject to
discriminatory reserve requirements until 1971.
79 See M. Bordo, ‘The Bretton Woods international monetary system: a historical overview’, and M.
Obstfeld, ‘The adjustment mechanism’, both in Bordo and Eichengreen, A Retrospective. On capital
controls and regulation on international banking, see R. H. Mills, ‘The regulation of short term
capital movements in major industrial countries’, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
StaV Economic Studies, 74 (1972); and OECD, Regulations AVecting International Banking Operations of
Banks and Non-Banks (Paris, 1978).160 financial history review
‘comparable to that of coke smelting in the development of iron and steel, the steam
engine in the development of railways, and the computer in information pro-
cessing’.80 Eurobanking’s development can be analysed as a process of ﬁnancial
innovation based upon functional, self-reinforcing interrelationships between three
international markets – Eurocurrency, Eurocredit and Eurobond. These encom-
passed deposit and loan facilities from short-term to long-term, and were connected
through the pervasive multinational expansion of commercial banks. Eurobanking
is deﬁned by its distinctive features of scale, institutional framework and location. It
was a wholesale development,81 operating external intermediation,82 not subject to
costly regulation83 and mainly located in oﬀshore ﬁnancial centres.84
The concentration of dollar deposits in London was favoured by political as well
as conjunctural factors.85 Due to the strict regulation of American commercial
banks’ domestic time deposits, British merchant and overseas banks, as well as
foreign banks (including branches of American banks), could oﬀer higher interest
rates.86 Originally, the Eurodollar was mainly considered an alternative means of
ﬁnancing trade. First-rank banks with stronger attracting power stockpiled
Eurodollar deposits. They employed part in trade ﬁnance by means of letters of
credit, bill discounting and ‘forfaiting’,87 and invested excess liquidity through
80 Podolski, Financial Innovation, p. 113.
81 Wholesale banking (as opposed to retail banking) deals with large deposit and loan transactions
between banks and large customers (corporate and sovereign).
82 External intermediation (cross-currency and cross-border at one time, i.e. foreign currency
denominated transactions with foreign customers) is the key-concept adopted by BIS and IMF in
order to provide a statistical measure of Eurobanking. A detailed discussion of Eurocurrency
statistics is in G. Dufey and I. H. Giddy, The International Money Market (Englewood Cliﬀs, NJ,
1978), pp. 21–34, and R. B. Johnston, The Economics of the Euro-Market. History, Theory and Policy
(London, 1983), pp. 35–55.
83 The term ‘unregulated’ can be misleading and needs qualiﬁcation. Eurobanking in fact was unregu-
lated (that is, not subject to reserve requirements, deposit insurance and control over interest rates
and credit allocation) when considered from the point of view of the attitude of monetary authori-
ties in Eurocurrency centres towards currency business of foreign banks with non-residents. But
Eurobanking activity of banks outside Eurocurrency centres (that is, their access to the
Eurocurrency markets) was generally subject to binding regulation from the second half of the
1960s and throughout the 1970s.
84 Financial centres with relative advantages in term of regulation and taxation of ﬁnancial activities.
85 A major though somehow overemphasised factor was the willingness by countries of the Soviet
bloc to hold their international dollar reserves in London rather than in New York, where the
political risk of Cold War leading to ‘freezing’ enemy resources was considered too high. Oil
exporter countries were motivated by similar worries to move funds to London after the Suez crisis
of 1956. Also the ban on the use of sterling to ﬁnance third-party trade, introduced by British
monetary authorities in 1957, is often mentioned as a factor that motivated British banks to resort
to the dollar to ﬁnance international trade.
86 From the 1930s Regulation Q set ceilings to interest payable on time deposits by American banks.
87 ‘Forfaiting’ was an innovative technique of ﬁnancing trade of capital goods with East European,
Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, based on the discounting of promissory notes and
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lending to other banks in London and elsewhere. Soon a market for dollar deposits
developed, based upon a network of telephone and telex lines, arising from the
brokerage functions performed by London agents as well major banks’ dealing
rooms created within foreign-exchange departments. Market imperfections and
transaction costs, stemming from uncertainty as to creditworthiness, availability of
funds and possible outlets, were rapidly overcome. By the early 1960s, traditional
bilateral practice, often based on reciprocity arrangements, had evolved into a true
international money market, closely interconnected to the foreign-exchange market
(where banks covered exchange risk forward). It quoted autonomously-determined
interest rates (though characterised by a strong covariation with rates prevailing on
the American money market due to the largely dominant role of Eurodollars).88
Traditionally measured as outstanding external positions (i.e. foreign currency
liabilities or assets vis-a `-vis non-residents) of reporting banks in 15 OECD countries
and other selected Eurocurrency oﬀshore centres, the Eurocurrency market’s gross
size grew at an annual average compound rate of 26 per cent over the period from
the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. This was more rapid than domestic banking,
international trade and world output,89 thanks to the competitive stance of
Eurodeposits relative to all major national money markets. It came about through
the attraction of wholesale liquid funds of banks, central banks, industrial companies
and private wealth-holders to the Euromarket.
A fundamental characteristic of the market was the large share represented by
interbank dealings (up to 50 per cent of total Eurocurrency transactions). The
interbank market was based upon a hierarchical structure – with large New York
multinational banks at the top – reﬂecting diﬀerentials in creditworthiness and
riskiness among participating banks. Due to the large number of banks, high stan-
dardisation of products and procedures, the lack of regulatory costs and low infor-
mation and transaction costs, the market was also extremely competitive and
operated on very narrow margins. It has been considered by economists as a remark-
able case of a near-perfect market,90 whose eﬃciency was critically enhanced during
the 1970s by the establishment of international, interconnected private clearing
systems and new advanced information and quoting services oﬀered by agencies
such as Reuter and Telerate.91 These have further enabled the interbank market to
88 On the emergence of the Eurodollar market, see P. Einzig and B. S. Quinn, The Euro-Dollar System.
Practice and Theory of International Interest Rates (London, 1977); and M. S. Mendelsohn, Money on the
Move. The Modern International Capital Market (New York, 1980); new historical evidence in C. R.
Schenk, ‘The origins of the Eurodollar market in London: 1955–1963’, Explorations in Economic
History, 35 (1998).
89 See Bryant, International Financial, pp. 58–73. The market grew from $20b. to $2,600b. equivalent
(at current prices and exchange rates) – a striking performance, even after adjusted in order to allow
for double-counting arising from interbank operations.
90 Analyses of the economics of the Eurocurrency markets draw heavily on transaction cost econ-
omics: see Johnston, The Economics; and H. D. Gibson, The Euro-Currency Markets, Domestic Financial
Policy and International Instability (London, 1989).
91 E. Sarver, The Eurocurrency Market Handbook (New York, 1988), pp. 207–21.162 financial history review
perform its fundamental functions of smoothing, transferring and globally redistri-
buting international liquidity.92 Like other interbank wholesale markets, it can also
be interpreted as an informal institutional arrangement enabling banks to monitor
each other (with information included in the spread), and to share liquidity and
credit risk through mutual insurance.93
The existence of an eﬃcient interbank Euro-money market was a crucial pre-
requisite for the rapid growth of international medium-term lending during the
second half of the 1960s. Initially for medium-term loans, individual banks (either
commercial banks or specialised subsidiaries or joint-ventures) extended it to corpor-
ate borrowers. After 1973, with the ‘recycling’ of the dollar surpluses of oil-exporting
countries deposited in the Eurodollar market, it recorded an explosive growth in the
form of medium- and long-term international lending to foreign governments.
The Eurocredit market was closely linked to the Eurocurrency market since
banks secured in the latter a large amount of funds used to ﬁnance their Euroloans
portfolio, while borrowers temporarily re-deposited part of loan proceeds, pending
use, in the Euro-money market.94 Eurolending triggered both product and process
innovations. Fixed-interest loans with medium-term maturity (two to three years)
provided by individual banks during the market’s early phase – an adaptation of
American-style term corporate lending – soon gave way to innovative ﬂexi-rate
roll-over credits. These were longer-term loans (up to eight years), granted at a
ﬂoating rate - determined as a ﬁxed spread over the costs of funding in the market
and periodically adjusted to the prevailing short-term Eurodollar interbank rate
(LIBOR).95 The move to ‘cost-plus’ contracts was propelled by the increased
92 Liquidity smoothing implies a reduction of transaction costs thanks to the economisation of the
volume of precautionary balances held by banks; liquidity transfer oﬀsets concentration of primary
deposits with top names through interbank lending to lower standing banks; global liquidity
redistribution compensates for excess demands and supplies between Eurobanking centres and the
global network of local markets): see BIS, ‘The international interbank market. A descriptive study’,
BIS Economic Papers, 8 (1983), pp. 9–17.
93 In wholesale banking, stochastic-based insurance in the form of reserve holding (as in retail
banking) is impossible, since the small number of very large depositors and borrowers inhibits the
functioning of the law of large numbers and satisfactory risk diversiﬁcation, which only very big
banks could aﬀord. By lending part of deposits received to other banks in the interbank market the
risk that deposits can be withdrawn at short notice is spread across a number of banks. See Davis
and Lewis, Domestic and International, pp. 108–10.
94 Most Eurocredits (over 90%) used to be provided in dollars, at least initially, in the 1960s and 1970s.
Many contracts, however, gave borrowers the right of choosing other currencies for each roll-over
period (provided that banks were able to obtain the currencies in the market for the periods
required).
95 In fact Eurobanks committed themselves to grant to borrowers a succession of short-term loans
over a medium-term period. A revolving commitment provides therefore a standby or insurance
facility against future uncertainties and long-term ﬂuctuations in cash ﬂows: see P. Einzig, Rollover
Credits. The System of Adaptable Interest Rates (London, 1973), pp. 22–4; and Mendelsohn, Money on
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instability of interest rates and enabled banks to ‘unbundle’ liquidity risk from
interest risk, shifting the latter entirely to borrowers (indeed, turning short-term
interest risk into medium-term default risk).96 Similarly, in response to foreign-
exchange volatility, multi-currency option ‘cost-plus’ contracts were sometimes
attached to roll-over loans, allowing borrowers to draw down funds in major
Eurocurrencies at LIBOR adjusted for conditions prevailing in the forward
exchange market.97
Whether Eurolending was to be considered a mere liquidity-distributing or a
liquidity-creating phenomenon has been debated among economists. In spite of
statistical evidence for substantial positive maturity mismatching by London banks
active in Eurobusiness, some argued that the data could be biased towards over-
estimating mismatching, whereas liquidity distribution in fact largely prevailed. The
debate focused upon the nature of roll-over credits and the basic features of over-
draft contracts. The former were usually categorised according to the period up to
the loan’s ultimate maturity date, not to the next short-term roll-over date, and the
latter were increasingly used in Eurobanking and considered long-term assets, irres-
pectively that repayment could have been agreed also at short term.98 However,
studies of contractual arrangements have conﬁrmed that roll-over credit generally
implied true long-term commitment. This was because banks customarily guaran-
teed automatic renewal at roll-over date and had no option to recall credits by
demanding early repayment.99 Such practice actually insured borrowers against the
risk of repayment during commitment periods in exchange for a premium (the
spread) against this ‘insurance’ service.100 This further reinforced the consensus view
that funding Euroloans by short-term borrowing in the Eurocurrency market
implied, in fact, extensive liquidity creation.101
Fromtheearly1970s, withrapidlygrowingaveragesize, longermaturitiesandkeener
competition, banks increasingly resorted to syndicating arrangements to manage
96 A necessary qualiﬁcation is that within the renegotiating period, banks face a limited, but potentially
proﬁt-eroding interest-rate risk. It is, however, a matter of unsettled debate whether borrowers are
better able to bear such risk than banks, that is whether ‘cost-plus’ contracts provide an eﬃcient
distribution of risk bearing.
97 Dufey and Giddy, The Evolution of Instruments, pp. 25–6.
98 See J. Niehans, International Monetary Economics (Baltimore, 1984), pp. 189–90.
99 Repayment usually took the form of single payment (‘lump sum’) at maturity date. Other methods
included instalments at dates ﬁxed in the contract, as well as options to repay the credit partially or
entirely after some minimum time.
100 It was such insurance that made a roll-over credit more attractive to borrowers relative to periodical
piecemeal borrowing on shorter terms. If contracts included early repayment option, borrowers
would have found themselves exposed to the risk to be called upon to raise cash to repay their
debts at unfavourable terms or in diﬃcult times. As a consequence, banks have to be seen as
carrying default risk for the entire commitment period, not for the period up to the next renewal:
see Einzig, Rollover Credits, pp. 54–5; and Davis and Lewis, Domestic and International, pp. 99–101.
101 For a comprehensive review of the debate on liquidity creation in Eurobanking, and a critical
discussion of available data and alternative methodologies to measure maturity mismatching, see
Gibson, The Eurocurrency Markets, pp. 146–59.164 financial history review
increased risk. This practice, under the coordination of one or more manager banks,
was well established in international capital markets (as has been remarked), and already
experimented with by American banks for domestic loans. It provided an eﬃcient
institutional arrangement – akin to coinsurance contracts – that allowed banks, even of
medium size, to compete, internationalise loan portfolios, spread market risk, downg-
rade individual exposure and manage non-systematic risk by diversifying into a spec-
trum of diﬀerent borrowers.102 Syndicate contracts, originally based on simple ‘best
eﬀort’ arrangements with very little risk borne by manager banks,103 became rapidly
standardised and highly formalised. This was because banks required increasingly com-
plex documentation (including covenants, restrictive clauses and tighter default clauses),
to protect themselves against risk. In part, it also arose as a consequence of American
banks’ dominant inﬂuence, they having a tradition of high formalisation in contractual
design relative to the informal attitude of British banks.104
However, the eﬃciency of syndicated lending in risk management has been
repeatedly questioned. As Davis and Lewis observe, risk-sharing implies converting
individual risks into system risks which, in turn, should advocate collective monitor-
ing arrangements.105 The post-1973 ‘boom and bust’ cycle of international lending,
triggered by ﬁerce competition in lending to developing countries for ﬁnancing
temporary payments imbalances, led in 1981–83 to the worst international debt
crisis since the Great Depression. It ended in the wearisome process of renegotiation
and rescheduling. Events suggest that banks’ propensity to develop collective moni-
toring arrangements was scarce at best.106 Indeed, studies of international banks’
102 Systematic or market risk measures how an asset covaries with the market’s return; as such, it is not
diversiﬁable. Non-systematic risk is independent of the market, and can be diversiﬁed away in
large portfolios. Davis and Lewis, Domestic and International, pp. 102–13, insist on similarities
between strategies adopted by international wholesale banks and insurance companies through
coinsurance and reinsurance.
103 Under a ‘best eﬀort’ loan, the manager was prepared to take up its amount (usually only a portion
of the total required by the borrower) only in the case of successful syndication. In the case of
unsuccessful syndication, the borrower got nothing. The main purpose was therefore to set such
conditions (rate and fees, maturity, amortisation, grace period and convenants) as the market could
agree to participate in the loan. Managers and agents had sometimes to pass on part of their return
from commissions and fees (earned from advising, contract negotiating, marketing and monitoring)
to other participants. For details on contractual arrangements and possible conﬂicts of interest in
syndicated lending, see T. H. Donaldson, Lending in International Commercial Banking (London,
1988), pp. 70–117.
104 For a description of the protective clauses, ﬁnancial covenant and ratios included in standard
Euroloan contracts, see ibid., Lending in International Commercial, pp. 118–35; and, more exten-
sively, J. A. Donaldson and T. H. Donaldson, The Medium Term Loan Markets (London, 1982).
105 Lewis and Davis, Domestic and International, pp. 14–19.
106 See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Banks and the International
Debt Crisis (New York, 1991), pp. 7–47. The study identiﬁed 3 groups of banks with a role of
managers and co-managers of international loans in 1974–82: the 5 largest US banks with dominant
positions (the ‘leaders’), 10 relatively smaller and particularly aggressive banks from USA, Canada
and Europe (the ‘challengers’), and a group of ‘followers’, mainly from Europe and Japan, relatively
less active in the organisation of syndicates.165 golden ages of international banking
behaviour during that period, primarily focused upon Latin America, conﬁrm that
they tended to over-lend to sovereign borrowers (including governments and public
sector companies). This was undertaken to promote accelerated asset and proﬁt
growth. Not least, it was a consequence of keener competition that allowed ‘chal-
lengers’ to engage successfully in price competition (with narrowing spreads par-
tially compensated by larger volumes) for creditworthy clients, so partially displacing
‘leaders’ from safer towards higher-return lending to riskier countries and markets.
Risk-sharing and risk-diversiﬁcation through syndicated loans proved ultimately to
be not much more than a ‘ﬁction’ since three-quarters of the net ﬂoating rate
syndicated debt outstanding in 1982 was concentrated in just four countries
(Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and South Korea).107
In this respect, international banks’ Eurolending behaviour has been charged with
conscious overlending, undue risk-taking, and ‘dysaster myopia’. That is with an
inability to evaluate fully the long-term consequences of roll-over ﬂoating rate
techniques, which inﬂicted upon borrowers repeated interest-rate shocks and rap-
idly backﬁred on banks in the form of transfer shocks. Observers have also empha-
sised the limits of international banks’ ability to monitor borrowers and the level of
general exposure in the interbank market.108 Commentators similarly pointed to
their responsibility for adopting collusive pricing practices with borrowers, such as
‘disguising’ credit and default risk in higher fees and commissions (on which scant
information was available), instead of signalling it in the spread.
The third Eurobanking pillar was the Eurobond market. Technically, Eurobonds
were not a novelty. As seen, dollar and sterling-denominated bonds had been
previously placed and circulated internationally. Throughout the 1950s and early
1960s, foreign governments, corporations and international organisations raised
capital by issuing bonds, mainly in Zurich109 and New York, where Swiss and
American authorities allowed liberal access. Nonetheless, Eurobonds,110 ﬁrst issued
in 1963, represented a product innovation. They were designed by British merchant
banks to enable European companies and EEC institutions to issue dollar-
denominated debt to European investors,111 while also lowering the cost of bor-
rowing by minimising government interference, taxes and other regulatory costs.
Eurobonds were given a critical boost by the Interest Equalisation Tax, a new
107 See Davis and Lewis, Domestic and International, pp. 357–8.
108 See Guttentag and Herring, ‘Disaster myopia’, pp. 5-26.
109 Foreign borrowing in Zurich capital market was stopped by Swiss monetary authorities in 1961
because of domestic monetary policy considerations.
110 Foreign bonds are issued by foreign borrowers in a single country, denominated in the currency
and underwritten and sold by a group of banks or issuing houses of the lending country. Eurobonds
are bonds denominated in dollars or (to a lesser extent) in other currencies, issued by both
corporate and sovereign borrowers mainly in London and Luxembourg, oﬀered for sale in various
countries, simultaneously, through international syndicates.
111 See I. M. Kerr, A History of the Eurobond Market. The First 21 Years (London, 1984), pp. 11–16; and
K. Burk (ed.), ‘Witness seminar on the origins and early development of the Eurobond market’,
Contemporary European History, I (1992).166 financial history review
regulatory device introduced by the American authorities in 1963 to curb the
outﬂow of portfolio capital and constrain European resort to the ‘yankee bond’
market.112 It gave sovereign and corporate borrowers (including many American
multinationals, barred by capital controls from raising capital domestically, to fund
overseas investment) a push to turn to the Eurobond market. Increasing ﬂexibility
of facilities available was also a strong incentive for borrowers to approach the
market. These included multiple-currency, parallel and convertible bonds113 and
substantial deregulation, namely the absence of controls and registration procedures,
relatively low interest rates and underwriting fees, less detailed information require-
ments, tolerance over disclosure and lower transaction costs than those incurred by
raising capital piecemeal in each individual country. At the same time, virtually total
tax exemption (as bearer bonds were exempted from withholding and income tax
on interest receipts) gave Eurobonds success with international investors. These
included Swiss trustees and investment funds that managed liquid resources of
international private wealth-holders (stereotyped in the ﬁgure of ‘the Belgian den-
tist’), ﬁnancial institutions and corporate companies.114 However, inﬂation and high
interest rates from the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s made ﬁxed income
securities unattractive and constrained the expansion of new issues on the Eurobond
market. They were largely outpaced by the explosive growth of more ﬂexible (and
even more secretive) syndicated Euroloans. The secondary market, based upon
unoﬃcial, over-the-counter dealings transacted by telex or telephone,115 was slow
to deepen. An eﬃcient clearing system only developed during the early 1970s,
when Euroclear in Brussels and Cedel in Luxembourg eliminated the need for
physical movements of bonds for most transactions. Furthermore, the Association
of International Bond Dealers (AIBD) disciplined Eurobond secondary trading by
introducing standard methods for calculating yields and provided regular market
information.116 The market suﬀered also from a few defaults – on bonds issued by
112 The IET – actually a currency control in disguise – placed a tax on US purchases of foreign long-
term securities, thus increasing the cost of foreign borrowing in the US and equalising interest rates
on long-term ﬁnancing in the US and abroad. Borrowers from Canada and developing countries
were exempted from IET. The tax was gradually reduced in the early 1970s and eventually lifted
in 1974.
113 Beyond multiple-currency bonds, other innovative products were oﬀered, such as currency-
option-clause bonds, denominated in a single national currency but with option of repayments in
another currency in order to strengthen the exchange guaranty for the investor. Parallel bonds
were multinational issues composed of several loans ﬂoated simultaneously among various coun-
tries, with each participating country raising one loan in its own currency, at terms and conditions
as uniform as possible. A survey of Eurobond products is in P. Gallant, The Eurobond Market (New
York, 1988), pp. 24–9.
114 In a number of European countries exchange and capital controls prevented domestic investors
from purchasing foreign securities. The British Foreign Exchange Control, for example, allowed
subscription of foreign securities only through the use of investment dollars.
115 Eurobonds in fact were listed at stock exchanges (mainly London and Luxembourg) only to enable
institutional investors to side-step regulation that forbade purchases of unquoted securities.
116 On AIBD, Euroclear and Cedel, see Kerr, A History, pp. 91–102.167 golden ages of international banking
companies controlled by Investors Overseas Service (IOS), the largest international
fund manager and a major Eurobond subscriber which collapsed in 1969–70 after
speculation and the misappropriation of funds.
Therefore, the heyday of Eurobonds only began during the late 1970s. The
market took oﬀ in the early 1980s, under the inﬂuence of conjunctural factors
(deﬂation, global recession, international debt crisis) and structural changes (‘ﬂight
to quality’, more prudential attitudes by international banks, and the general dis-
placement of international-bank credit by mounting ‘securitisation’).117 Previously,
however, signiﬁcant changes had occurred in the techniques of international syndi-
cation and risk management. During the 1960s, manager banks (led by German
universal banks, such as Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, and innovative
American and British merchant banks such as Morgans, White Weld, Warburgs,
Hambros and N. M. Rothschild) had ‘naturalised’ the American-style model of
syndicate within the European environment.118 Managers and co-managers, beyond
providing advice services related to an issue, established underwriting syndicates
(committed to purchase a portion of the issue, usually ‘a ` la parisienne’) and large
selling groups, including banks, insurance companies, stock-exchange ﬁrms and
institutional investors. Underwriters as well as secondary market makers ﬁnanced
part of their temporary commitments by borrowing in the Eurodollar and other
Eurocurrency markets,119 while borrowers, adopting a liquidity-stockpiling
approach, channelled some funds raised back to the Eurocurrency market in the
form of short-term deposits.
During the early period, syndicate contracts were designed to minimise the risk
actually assumed by managing and underwriting banks. In fact, the Eurobond
market was essentially a ‘placement market’, whereby, in the absence of public issue
and bond rating, bonds were allocated privately. The underwriting contract between
managers and the borrower was usually formalised only after market-testing –
involving an open pricing period of variable duration (to determine the ﬁnal price
of a successful placement) - during which large blocks of the issue were allocated
and terms negotiated between syndicate members. In the case of prospective failure,
the syndicate could refuse to sign the contract, adopt evasive measures – raise the
coupon, price the issue at larger discount, cut the size and lengthen the selling
period – or resort to ‘market-out clauses’. Banks enjoyed, therefore, a strong
position over borrowers, reinforced by very limited competition and the prevalence
of collusive behaviour. Ponderous underwriting and selling syndicates (based some-
times on random selection and allotment) tended to incorporate correspondent
relationships and reciprocity factors, such as cross-ownership, as well as traditional
117 For a concise history of trends in the market, see F. G. Fisher, Eurobonds (London, 1988), pp. 5–29.
118 See P. Einzig, Foreign Dollar Loans in Europe (London, 1965), pp. 13–14.
119 This proved especially true when low short-term interest rates in the Eurodollar or Eurocurrency
markets created wide yield curves and large proﬁt opportunities on Eurobond investments. Banks
were therefore induced to borrow extensively in the short-term market to ﬁnance their voluntary
holdings of Eurobonds.168 financial history review
relationships and alliances, irrespective of actual distribution strength and origination
activity. Syndicates could encompass up to 200 ﬁnancial institutions, some earning
underwriting fees in spite of modest distribution capability and little genuine
investor demand.120
Oligopolistic and collusive behaviour only began to fade during the late 1970s
and the early 1980s. This arose from booming Eurobond issues, shortening average
maturities (from ten to 20 years, common before 1974, to ﬁve to seven years
prevailing during the early 1980s), increased professional sophistication of bond
brokers, and keener competition by aggressive specialised American investment
banks and Japanese securities houses. Competition brought about a higher propen-
sity on the part of manager banks to take risk in order to gain market share.
Innovations, such as pre-priced and auction-based bought deals, shifted market
power from banks to borrowers, made Eurobond investment banking a far more
challenging business for banks. It required an ability to anticipate market conditions
and match underwriting syndicates with actual placing power.121
The introduction of ‘grey-market’ trading – through which the discounted prices
of issues, either oﬃcially priced or simply announced, were circulated – formalised
bond price discounting, improved market transparency and ﬁlled the gap between
the primary and the secondary markets. However, it was a practice sometimes
strongly opposed by syndicates of managers.122 In the new system, which increas-
ingly moved towards ‘price banking’, large and often ineﬃcient syndicates were
replaced by small, aggressive syndicates, whose members also acted as secondary
market makers while having been selected on the basis of geographical specialis-
ation. As a consequence, competition-oriented banks resorted to new practices of
risk management. Banks allocated more capital and medium-term liabilities to the
business against the risk of adverse market conditions, unsuccessful syndication and
discounted prices in primary markets, let alone increasing the illiquidity of bonds
in the secondary market.123 They also improved their ability to monitor the
120 For institutional details of Eurobond contracts, see Y. S. Park, The Eurobond Market. Function and
Structure (London, 1974), pp. 44–9 and 90–103.
121 In pre-priced deals, lead manager and a small managing group priced and underwrote the whole
issue, thus anticipating market conditions before entering the deal. In bought deals, borrowers
invited few banks to tender for the deal and choose the cheapest oﬀer; aggressive investment
bankers quoted the ﬁnal price, underwrote the whole transaction and took responsibility to arrange
a syndicate, often resorting to pre-arranged informal clubs of major underwriters.
122 Debt and equity warrants gave investors the option to convert the warrant into a debt instrument
or an equity under agreed conditions at an agreed time in the future. Currency warrants gave the
investor the right to buy an amount of a currency at an agreed exchange rate at a predetermined
time in the future. Bonds with warrants attached usually reduced the all-in cost to the borrowers.
Zero coupons were designed to turn income from bonds into a capital gain - particularly attractive
to some investors for tax avoidance reasons.
123 As a rule, given the high number of issues and their larger average size, trading in the secondary
market proved increasingly diﬃcult. The life cycle of a successful bond at the end of the 1980s was
expected to head towards increasing illiquidity shortly after its issue.169 golden ages of international banking
performance of participants in underwriting syndicates to prevent the risk of whole-
sale selling and dumping of bonds.124 To achieve such challenging tasks, they could
resort to active asset and liability management – an innovative technique that
marked the most important structural change in the recent history of banking.
The rise of Eurobanking over the 1960s and 1970s triggered two fundamental,
long-lasting structural changes: the ultimate multinationalisation of commercial
banking; and the transition towards innovative management techniques.
Eurobanking provided a most powerful incentive for large commercial banks of
Western countries expanding their transnational activities to an unprecedented
extent.125 Internationalisation became a pervasive phenomenon in both industrial-
ised and developing economies, so marking a deﬁnite discontinuity with the legacy
of the era of nationalistic retrenchment. Banking at the end of the 1950s had still
been a world of closed and disintegrated national systems, dominated by regulation,
oligopolistic structures, collusive behaviour, barriers to entry, market segmentation
and lack of innovation. Two decades later, it had turned into a continually
expanding unregulated enclave of wholesale business, based upon international
integration, generally free access, keen market competition and advanced techno-
logical as well as ﬁnancial innovation. Eurobanking from the 1970s represented,
therefore, to large commercial banks of Western countries their opportunity of
growth. To fully exploit it, however, banks were forced towards a path of deep
structural and managerial change.
The dynamic of banking multinationalisation during the 1960s and 1970s can be
conceptualised as a self-reinforcing interaction between derived demand and regu-
lation arbitrage. Relationship banking provided a particularly strong incentive to
expand multinational branch networks in order to supply services to corporate
customers with large international and multinational activities. Foreign-branch net-
works established in Europe by American and Japanese commercial banks from the
1960s provided a classic case of ‘follow- (or accompany-) the-customer’ strategy,
whereby ownership-speciﬁc and internalisation advantages were used to surmount
the potential competition of local banks and, sometimes, to gain market share in
local retail business. At the same time, growth and proﬁt opportunities related to
Eurobanking provided strong incentives to locate foreign branches within
Eurocurrency centres in order to exploit location-speciﬁc advantages and diﬀeren-
tials (as to interest rate, regulation and tax system).126 American money-centre
124 For a detailed description of the evolution of Eurobond syndication and distribution techniques
since the 1960s, see Kerr, A History, pp. 103–11; and more extensively, Gallant, The Eurobond
Market, pp. 20–44 and 116–43. Morgan Stanley, White Weld and Credit Suisse First Boston are
regarded as the ﬁrst banks to introduce aggressive competition and sophisticated professionalism
into the market.
125 A general picture of strategies and implications of multinational banking is in Pecchioli, The
Internationalisation, pp. 51–84.
126 See R. Dale, The Regulation of International Banking (Cambridge, MA, 1984). The crucial role of
regulation is also emphasised by R. Weston, Domestic and Multinational Banking (London, 1980).170 financial history review
banks, through foreign branches and Edge-Act subsidiaries,127 circumvented dom-
estic regulation on interest-rate ceilings and exploited competitive advantages in
attracting Eurodollar deposits. Foreign branches also enabled parent banks to bypass
domestic capital controls (by granting loans to ﬁnance American multinationals’
foreign investments). Furthermore, they partially oﬀset domestic monetary policy
(by channelling funds raised abroad back home, as during the credit crunches of
1966 and 1969), and allowed diversiﬁcation towards international investment bank-
ing, thus circumventing Glass-Steagall Act.128 In a similar fashion, continental banks
– especially German and Italian – were induced to establish branches and subsidiaries
in London or Luxembourg to evade regulation and controls imposed by their
monetary authorities on Eurobanking activities (for purposes related to monetary
and balance-of-payments policy) carried out from home-based headquarters. At the
same time, European banks were strongly motivated to enter Eurobanking, expand
foreign-branch networks and provide innovative international services to defend
their corporate customer bases from American competition.129
As a consequence, growth opportunities created by Euromarkets have been
exploited by ‘externalising’ Eurobanking in oﬀshore ﬁnancial centres, either large
‘entrepo ˆt’, fully functional centres of international (London) or regional relevance
(Luxembourg, Singapore, Hong Kong), or mere booking centres such as the
Caribbean tax heavens. In 1981 a ‘duty-free’ banking enclave was created by
American monetary authorities under International Banking Facilities (IBFs) – a
deregulation device that attracted part of Eurocurrency business from Caribbean
oﬀshore centres back to the United States.130 The consolidation of oﬀshore and
other foreign branches into an integrated network allowed transnational banks to
provide eﬃciently innovative services – such as global cash management and quick
international funds transfer – and to internalise function, such as interest and cur-
rency arbitrage or distribution of international liquidity. Indeed, since the early
1970s the share of ‘inter-oﬃce’ dealings (i.e. between branches of the same bank)
127 Edge Act Corporations were federally chartered subsidiaries of bank members of the Federal
Reserve system, created for the purpose of engaging in international banking operations. Relative
to domestic commercial banks, Edge Act corporations enjoyed the privilege of being allowed to
hold stock in non-banking companies, and to provide a variety of investment banking services
(including underwriting, distributing and dealing in debt and equity securities) in foreign countries.
128 See J. Kelly, Bankers and Borders. The Case of American Banks in Britain (Cambridge, MA, 1977);
D. R. Kane, The Euro-Dollar Market and the Years of Crisis (London, 1983); and M. De Cecco,
‘Inﬂation and structural change in the Eurodollar market’, in idem and J. P. Fitoussi (eds), Monetary
Theory and Economic Institutions (London, 1987), pp. 188–94. On the credit crunches of 1966 and
1969, see Wojnilower, ‘The central role’.
129 On British banks’ reaction to American competition in the 1970s, see D. Channon, British Banking
Strategy and the International Challenge (London, 1977). See also Jones, British Multinational,
pp. 320–35.
130 Under IBFs, all US banks were permitted to establish special units (in fact a separate set of books)
to conduct from the USA Eurocurrency borrowing and lending operations without incurring
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within the Eurocurrency interbank market has never stopped rising.131 Virtually all
big-league Western commercial banks entered joint-ventures. This was to establish
(mainly in London) ‘consortium banks’, international banks functionally and geo-
graphically specialised in the provision of international payment and Eurobanking
services to assist corporate customers of member banks in their multinational expan-
sion in emerging countries in Asia and Latin America. However, their success was
short-lived, with the scope for their growth often restrained by conﬂict of interests
when shareholders’ individual strategies of growth in Eurobanking challenged those
of the consortia.132 Many large European and Japanese banks also established
branches and subsidiaries or acquired local American banks in order to create a
stable dollar deposit base, reduce or eliminate the cost of hedging against exchange
risk and partially compensate for the competitive advantage enjoyed by American
banks.133
Even more important, all major transnational banks developed multiple func-
tions. They conducted foreign-exchange operations, engaged in Eurocurrency trade
ﬁnancing and Eurolending, acquired control of or merged with investment banks,
and managed or participated in Eurobond underwriting syndicates. As a whole,
therefore, large growth-oriented transnational banks moved towards universal bank-
ing. Innovative liquidity management was thus required to perform liquidity cre-
ation and manage risk eﬃciently. Eurocurrency borrowing by banks (apart from
American prime-takers) usually relied upon small ‘core deposits’ and was extensively
ﬁnanced in the interbank market. Liquidity management functions on a cash-
ﬂow basis became necessary to ensure that maturing deposits were repaid from
the proceeds of maturing assets or replaced by fresh borrowing. This caused the
emergence of ‘asset and liability management’.
It was institutionalised by banks in order to deal more eﬃciently with the
uncertainty arising from withdrawals of short-term deposits, draw-downs of loan
commitments and variations in loan repayments. It was based essentially upon the
ability to manipulate the volume, composition and cost of fund raising on the
international money market to ﬁnance positions taken in the asset side of the
balance sheet – a process referred to also as ‘marketisation’ of banking.134 Initially,
‘liability management’ meant essentially developing an eﬃcient dealing-room
131 Large multinational banks tended to privilege inter-oﬃce business and resorted to interbank market
only when the latter could oﬀer better conditions. Others used some foreign branches to centralise
control of their interbank business and redistribute funds internally: see BIS, ‘The international
interbank’, pp. 15–17.
132 See D. Ross, ‘European banking clubs in the 1960s: a ﬂawed strategy’, Business and Economic
History, 27 (1998).
133 In fact, before 1978 foreign banks in the USA were not subject to reserve requirements and
prohibition of interstate branching: see S. H. Kim and S. W. Miller, Competitive Structure of the
International Banking Industry (Lexington, 1983), pp. 25–45.
134 The concept of ‘marketisation’ of banking is used in a OECD study by G. Bingham, Banking and
Monetary Policy (Paris, 1985). On liability management techniques, see R. Harrington, Asset and
Liability Management by Banks (Paris, 1987).172 financial history review
function to access borrowing in the interbank market. From the late 1960s, how-
ever, international banks successfully promoted ﬁnancial innovations that multiplied
‘securitised’ asset and liability management instruments. Negotiable Euro-
Certiﬁcates of Deposits (Euro-CDs), a ﬁnancial ‘technology transfer’ from the
American money market (where negotiable CDs had been pioneered by Citibank
in 1961), brought about substantial cost advantages relative to ﬁxed time deposits of
equivalent maturity. This was due to additional liquidity guaranteed by the exist-
ence of a secondary market, developed in London by specialised dealers.135 During
the 1970s banks also resorted extensively to the issue of Euronotes (Floating Rate
Notes – FRNs), medium-term securities similar to Eurobonds with ﬂoating interest
rates periodically reset and adjusted to LIBOR. This helped strengthen the medium-
term component of their liability sides and kept maturity mismatching under con-
trol. In fact, Euronotes guaranteed long-term availability of funds at a cost varying
periodically with market rates, thus unbundling ‘funding risk’ from ‘interest rate’
risk.136 Since Euro-CDs and Euronotes were largely subscribed for by banks, their
markets acquired some characteristics of interbank markets.
On the asset side, the most signiﬁcant innovation emerged during the late 1970s
with Note Issuance Facilities (NIFs), a sophisticated form of commitment banking.
It enabled banks to expand their businesses at only marginal risk and limited
additional pressure on capital ratios. Under NIFs contracts, corporate borrowers
were allowed to raise medium-term funds through a stream of short-term notes at
set maturities (actually the equivalent of ﬂexi-rate roll-over Euroloans with guaran-
teed renewal). Banks, in turn, individually or through a syndicate, organised placing
arrangements. These took the form of tender panels, backed by an underwriting
clause committing them to act as residual buyers of unsold notes at price and
conditions speciﬁed in the contract. This was an arrangement that actually reduced
maturity mismatching and risk, and enhanced the overall liquidity of international
banks’ loan portfolios.137
The adoption of asset and liability management in Eurobanking represented a
sea-change. It marked a strong discontinuity with the past through implying a
radical change in the nature of bank liquidity. As seen, prewar international banking
was based upon a traditional concept of liquidity as a portfolio of liquid assets that
could be turned into cash at short notice and on predictable terms (by redemption,
sale or use as collateral for borrowing). With Eurobanking and its innovative inter-
active management of assets and liabilities, a new concept of liquidity emerged. This
was based upon banks’ ability to compete in ﬁnancial markets by issuing liabilities
at market rates and to arbitrage eﬃciently among the cost of diﬀerent funding
135 Euro-CD was deﬁned as ‘the ﬁrst new negotiable instrument created under English Law since
1896’, quoted by Dufey and Giddy, The Evolution, p. 21.
136 Actually Euronotes were issued for the ﬁrst time in 1969 by corporate borrowers as a means of
disintermediating bank lending and tapping funds directly from investors in the market.
137 On Euronotes, NIFs and other ﬁnancial innovations see Davis and Lewis, Domestic and International,
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sources. It was portfolio behaviour pioneered by American banks from the late
1960s, both domestically and internationally,138 and increasingly adopted by
Western banks thereafter.139
IV
The 90 years between the Baring crisis and the international debt crisis of 1981
witnessed the rise, peak and transmutation of commercial banks’ leadership in
international ﬁnancial intermediation. During the decades before 1914, continental
universalbanken and British joint-stock banks reacted to incentives stemming from a
rapidly expanding international economy successfully to challenge the dominance
of specialised institution in all trade-related banking services. This reached its mature
phase during the 1920s, when commercial banks intensiﬁed their multinational
expansion, internalised functions in trade ﬁnance, foreign exchange and interbank
transmission of liquidity – previously performed mainly through markets and
specialised brokers – and integrated the functioning of foreign-exchange depart-
ments into their domestic activity. They also increasingly moved into investment
banking to participate, as managers, underwriters and sellers, in international syndi-
cates for placing foreign bonds issued in major ﬁnancial centres. In their rise to
international leadership, commercial banks enjoyed ownership-speciﬁc competitive
advantages in terms of size, relationships with internationally-oriented corporate
customers and managerial resources. They were also able to exploit economies of
scale and scope and technological innovations to cut information and transaction
costs. Financial process and organisational innovations, such as the ‘nostro’ account
system, modern spot and forward exchange dealings, interbank borrowing and
lending and international syndicates, fostered the functional evolution of correspon-
dent banking. They became pillars of a new international ﬁnancial architecture,
based upon cooperative networks and informal mutual insurance arrangements for
reciprocal monitoring and risk sharing.
Gradually re-emerging from interwar and postwar nationalistic retrenchment,
with the relaxation of foreign-exchange controls and the return to external con-
vertibility in the late 1950s, commercial banks de-frosted, reactivated and enlarged
their cooperative international networks. With little scope for expansion in either
over-regulated and oligopolistic domestic banking or traditional trade-related inter-
national business, they successfully exploited regulatory asymmetries and the benign
attitude of monetary authorities to launch into ‘external’ intermediation. The rapid
138 See E. J. Kane, ‘The three faces of commercial bank liability management’, in M. P. Dooley et al.
(eds), The Political Economy of Policy-Making (Beverly Hills/London, 1979), pp. 149–74. On US
banks’ portfolio behaviour, see L. L. Kreicher, ‘Eurodollar arbitrage’, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York Quarterly Review, 7 (1982), pp. 10–23.
139 See OECD, Trends in Banking in OECD Countries, Report to the Committee on Financial Markets
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growth of the Eurodollar (and other Eurocurrency) market, and its ‘core’ interbank
component, created breathtakingly a growing system of global liquidity redistri-
bution oﬀering enormous opportunities for growth and creating scope for unbridled
competition. Commercial banks were strongly motivated to ‘externalise’ inter-
national business in ﬁnancial ‘entrepo ˆt’ and oﬀshore centres to exploit regulatory
and tax advantages. They rapidly expanded their networks of branches in major
global and regional centres from the late 1960s. With the emergence of the Euro-
credit and Euro-bond markets, Eurobanking became a system characterised by high
growth, keen competition and increasing international liquidity creation.
Unregulated and low-cost ‘external’ intermediation not only provided additional
business volume but also became a proﬁtable substitute for ‘traditional international’
and ‘domestic’ intermediation. These factors, along with ﬁnancial instability from
the late 1960s, further brought about the explosion of creative ﬁnancial thinking,
often pioneered by aggressive, growth-oriented American commercial banks.
Financial innovations, such as ﬂexi-rate roll-overs, NIFs, underwriting syndicates,
Euro-CDs and Euronotes, implemented by increasingly sophisticated contractual
arrangements, were designed to share, shift and unbundle risk, and to impart higher
liquidity to both primary and secondary assets and liabilities. Asset and liability
management eventually emerged to mark a strong historical discontinuity that,
within the deregulating international environment of the 1980s, also began to
feature in domestic banking and so pave the way for a true revolution in commercial
banking.140
However, the general consequences of this process of continuous microeconomic
re-optimisation are open questions. Throughout the period, the prevalence of
institutional arrangements akin to mutual insurance tended to turn individual risk
into systemic risk, calling for collective monitoring and management. In this respect,
performances during the 1920s, as well as over the 1960s and 1970s, have been, at
best, controversial. Failure in the collective management of international liquidity,
under circumstances of increasing ﬁnancial interdependence, led to systemic failure
in 1931 and in 1971. Individual and collective ‘disaster myopia’ seemed to prevail in
each ‘boom-and-bust’ cycle of international lending. More speciﬁcally, the preva-
lence of syndicates as coinsurance arrangements, designed to share risk during
periods of intense competition and rapid business growth, seems not only to have
failed to allow true diversiﬁcation but also to have aﬀected adversely incentives to
eﬃcient monitoring and market transparency. A reaction appears to have occurred
during the early 1980s, favoured by recession, consolidation and rationalisation of
international markets, the emergence of securitisation, and the enormously
enhanced capacities in information and risk processing allowed by communication
and computer technologies. Thanks also to more eﬀective monitoring and pruden-
tial supervision by national monetary authorities and international institutions, a
140 See E. Ballarin, Commercial Banks Amid the Financial Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1986); and
J. Canals, Competitive Strategies in European Banking (Oxford, 1993).175 golden ages of international banking
more selective attitude on the part of banks has eventually emerged towards proﬁt-
ability and asset quality, capital-to-asset ratios and risk assumed. This has arisen by
mainly privileging fee-generating oﬀ-balance sheet business, such as ﬁnancial
derivatives and commitment banking.141
141 See OECD, Trends in Banking in OECD Countries, Report to the Committee on Financial Markets
(Paris, 1985); and BIS, Recent Innovation in International Banking (Report prepared by a Study Group
established by G10 Central Banks) (Basle, 1986).